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Part I
Dissertation Overview
1

Dissertation Overview
Human capital is often expressed in broad terms, allowing for its wide thematic
applicability. While economics has mostly avoided such generalizations, it is not ex-
empt from the diﬃculties in defining human capital, although it is important across
a wide range of economic outcomes (e.g., wage formation, marital stability, health).
This dissertation focuses on the multi-dimensional nature of human capital skills, and
the eﬀect of these skill dimensions on the labor market, using data that has recently
allowed for skill-specific definitions of human capital. I am motivated by previous
work highlighting the importance of general human capital and skill accumulation. In
particular, I introduce multiple human capital skill dimensions to assess the impact of
employment tenure on wages in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 focuses on a gender dimension of
human capital occupational requirements interacting with life-time wage profiles with
respect to career breaks, again focusing on the multi-dimensional aspect of human cap-
ital skills. Building upon the ideas presented in the previous chapters, a computable
general equilibrium macroeconomic model is developed in Chapter 3 to assess the dy-
namics between wage inequality and human capital skill dimensions among males. The
importance of math skills, and its particular characteristics within the labor market,
link together the main results of each chapter. Thus, using micro- and macroeconomic
tools, a coherent picture of human capital skill dimensions within the labor market is
presented.
In Chapter 1, I include numerical definitions for math, verbal, science and technical
skills from the Occupational Information Network (O*net) database within previous
definitions of tenure to detail the contribution of specific human capital skills in the
observed increasing wage-tenure profile. By merging the O*net information to the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) sample, I am able to decompose
tenure by skill attributes. Previous estimates concentrate on separating the firm, in-
dustry and occupation tenure wage eﬀects using industry and occupation codes/labels
alone. While I use some similar definitions, I separate the entire career tenure eﬀect
into four skill equivalent tenure areas (math, verbal, science and technical). The results
indicate that these four skill areas are not uniformly important for all workers. I show
that math skills are of primary importance to college educated workers. In contrast,
technical skills are shown to be most important for non-college workers, with math and
verbal skills somewhat less significant. As in previous studies, I find that employment
4 Dissertation Overview
tenure alone has a negative eﬀect on wages. However, in contrast to previous studies,
general career tenure is shown to have a relatively small eﬀect on wages, with virtually
all increases in the wage-tenure profile attributable to skill-specific career tenure.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Michelle Rendall, we present and test the theory
that women rationally select occupational paths through preferences for skills that are
both resilient and repairable when faced with work gaps. To ground our subsequent
analysis, we present a model that generates significant economic incentives for women
to strongly prefer occupations that exhibit lower skill-specific depreciation and pur-
sue the accumulation of skills that are robust to work gaps. The examples provided
indicate that the combination of skills within an occupation is more important than
the occupation itself. That is, if the largest skill component within an occupation is
robust to career gaps, then the other skill requirements’ atrophy can be oﬀset. Us-
ing the NLSY and O*net, we show that college educated women avoid occupations
requiring significant math skills potentially due to the costly skill atrophy experienced
during a career break. In contrast, verbal skills are very robust to career interruptions.
The results support the broadly observed female preference for occupations primarily
requiring verbal skills - even though these occupations exhibit lower average wages.
Thus, skill-specific atrophy during employment leave and the speed of skill repair upon
returning to the labor market are shown to be important factors potentially underpin-
ning women’s occupational outcomes. This research suggests that female occupational
sorting could be determined by skill-specific atrophy-repair characteristics.
In Chapter 3, co-authored with Michelle Rendall, we are motivated by previous
results to investigate a broader math-based structure within a macroeconomic frame-
work that has strong implications for wage inequality. Standard skill-biased technical
change (SBTC) is a powerful mechanism in explaining the increasing wage gap be-
tween educated and uneducated individuals. However, SBTC cannot explain increas-
ing within-group wage inequality in the US. This chapter provides an explanation for
the observed intra-college group inequality by showing that the top decile earners’ sig-
nificant wage growth is underpinned by the link between ex ante ability, math-heavy
college majors and highly quantitative occupations. We develop a general equilibrium
model with multiple education outcomes, where wages are driven by individuals’ ex
ante abilities and acquired math skills. This model emphasizes math-biased technical
change (MBTC) and focuses on educational choices. Specifically, individuals make a
choice to attempt college or directly enter the labor market. As we are interested in
the outcome of the college education process, we directly assign math credits to indi-
viduals subject to ability constraints, with some individuals dropping out of college.
Math credits characterize each college major in our model. Individuals supply both
their ex post ability and any acquired math skills to the labor market, with only col-
5lege graduates supplying the math skills associated with college majors. The results
indicate that the SBTC and MBTC mechanisms aﬀect the wage distribution of college
graduates in opposite directions. SBTC alone benefits all college graduates in terms
of wages, but MBTC is eﬀective at increasing the wages of the top wage deciles of
college graduates. Thus, a large portion of within-group and general wage inequality
is explained by math-biased technical change (MBTC).
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Part II
Chapters
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1 The Value of Skill-Specific Experience
1.1 Introduction
The impact of tenure on wages is a seemingly simple positive relationship. However,
this superficial correlation conflates a number of important nuances that have driven
a five decade long debate covering the wage setting incentives, estimation methods
employed, and the measurement of tenure itself. Three main hypotheses have been
theorized for the observed increasing wage-tenure profile: better firm-worker matches
over time,1 principle-agent problem/selection screening,2 and human capital accumu-
lation.3 Recent literature focuses on human capital accumulation by focusing on three
tenure measures, each associated with a specific job dimension: (1) firm, (2) industry;
and (3) occupation.
This paper combines data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY) sample with the Occupational Information Network (O*net), to assess the
importance of skill-specific tenure. Tenure is usually decomposed into a maximum
of three components: firm, industry and occupation. However, this means tenure is
assessed using labels (e.g., secretary, lawyer), such as the three-digit Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) codes underpinning the US Census industry codes used in the
NLSY. In this setup, occupations cannot be meaningfully compared, meaning that the
accumulation of skills across occupations cannot be assessed. For example, how similar
are accountants and financial analysts? The O*net solves this problem by assigning
numerical skill requirements to each occupation across multiple skill dimensions. In
this paper, I use broad math, verbal, science and technical skill categories to summarize
1See Miller (1984), McCall (1990), Neal (1999) and Gibbons et al. (2005) for discussions concerning
the relationship between job search, firm-worker match quality and human capital, including various
tenure measurements.
2Lazear (1979) and Viscusi (1980) develop models where employee shirking is reduced through
deferred compensation. Freeman (1977) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) suggest that an increasing
wage-tenure profile generates insurance-like features for risk-averse workers who are uncertain about
future productivity. Salop and Salop (1976), Nickell (1976), Guasch and Weiss (1982) argue that
unproductive workers are less likely to apply to firms with increasing wage-tenure profiles. Burdett
and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004) suggest that increasing wage-tenure profiles promote employee
retention.
3The theoretical link between wage-tenure profiles and firm-specific human capital is well docu-
mented by Becker (1962), Oi (1962), Hall (1975), Mortensen (1978), Hashimoto (1981) and Topel
(1991).
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the skill requirements for each occupation.
Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) find that industry tenure is a primary wage deter-
minant. Specifically, using the NLSY, Parent finds that ten years of industry tenure is
associated with an increase in wages of 15 percent, whereas the return to ten years of
firm-specific tenure is -9 percent, but not statistically significant. Parent’s results us-
ing the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) are similar at 15 percent for industry
tenure and -1 percent for firm tenure. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) find that
industry and firm tenure are of little importance for wages when occupational tenure is
included, with ten years of tenure in firm, industry and occupation yielding 1, -2 and
18 percent wage changes, respectively. Sullivan (2010) exploits a coding change in the
NLSY starting in 1994 where occupation code changes can reliably used to signal career
changes, in contrast to previous eﬀorts that required coding changes across multiple
variables to identify a career change. Sullivan finds that both industry and occupa-
tion tenure are important determinants of wages for professional, but only occupation
tenure matters for non-professionals (e.g., craftsmen). Pavan (2011) notes that the IV
estimation method used by Parent, Kambourov and Manovskii and Sullivan, which
was first proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) to address the endogenous explana-
tory variables in such wage regressions, does not account for the two-step employment
search process (i.e., career followed by firm), leading to downward biased estimates of
firm tenure. Pavan (2011) finds that firm and industry tenure are equally important
wage determinants, but later concludes that a meaningful assessment of human capital
requires a dataset with information on the tasks and skills used in specific occupations.
This paper precisely expands the research in this dimensions. Specifically, by com-
bining skill information from the O*net with individual-level employment information
from the NLSY, I am able to estimate the returns to tenure for specific skills. By de-
composing tenure by skill attributes, rather than using industry and occupation labels
alone, I show that the accumulation of tenure in math skills is of primary importance
to college educated workers. In contrast, technical skills are shown to be most im-
portant for non-college workers, with math and verbal skills somewhat less significant.
As in previous studies, I find that employment tenure alone has a negative eﬀect on
wages. However, in contrast to previous studies, general career tenure is also shown to
have a negative eﬀect on wages, with virtually all increases in the wage-tenure profile
attributable to skill-specific experience.
The remainder of this paper is organized into three sections. Section 1.2 provides a
summary of the data and the basic concepts of the career definitions used in this study.
The data analysis, Section 1.3, starts with an explanation of the estimation function
and is followed by the results, with a discussion of the diﬀerent tenure return values
for 5 and 10 year time spans. Lastly, Section 1.4 concludes.
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1.2 Data
I use two data sources, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY)
and the Occupational Information Network (O*net), versions 4.0-9.0.4 The NLSY is
a individual-level panel data set providing wage, employment, tenure, occupation and
career information. The O*net provides numerical skill and task information for all
occupations, which is merged with the NLSY. I provide additional detail concerning
each data set below.
1.2.1 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY)
The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of individuals aged 14 to 22 in 1979
(i.e., individuals born between 1957 and 1964). Surveys were conducted on an annual
basis until 1994 and biannually thereafter. The original sample included 12,686 men
and women. I use observations from 1979 to 2000 because the industry coding basis
changed starting in 2001.5
The NLSY sample provides weekly observations for employment status from which
annual employment measures (e.g., tenure) are constructed. I define an individual’s
main job as the one in which they work the most hours in each week and year. As in
Pavan (2011), I restrict the sample to males, and exclude individuals with unobserved
initial labor market attachment and those who worked less than 1,200 hours for two
consecutive years while employed in a single job of at least 30 hours per week. Similarly,
I remove individuals who spend two or more years in military service. Note that full-
time workers who return to full-time schooling are included upon reentry into the
labor market. In addition, individuals missing important information (e.g., census
codes for industry or occupation)6 and those exhibiting weak labor force attachment7
are removed. Along the educational dimension, high school dropouts less than 16 years
old, high school graduates less than 18 years old and college graduates less than 21
4I thank Michelle Rendall for providing access to the NLSY merged O*net/DOT database infor-
mation.
5After 2000, the NLSY industry coding switched from one based on the Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) codes to a new classification system based on the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS). While there are reliable crosswalks across occupation classifications, no equivalent
crosswalks exists for industry codes.
6Missing census codes for industry and occupation are imputed using a variable linking each job
across multiple interview dates, when available.
7I follow Pavan (2011)’s weak labor force attachment definition. If an individual drops out of the
labor force for only one year, then that observation is deleted. If an individual drops out for more than
one year after spending at least ten years in the labor market, that observation and all the subsequent
observations are deleted. An individual is completely dropped from the data set if they drop out of
the labor force for more than a year after fewer than ten years in the labor market.
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Table 1.1: Sample Summary Statistics
VARIABLES All LTC C+
(1) (2) (3)
Age 27.5 (5.4) 26.9 (5.5) 28.9 (5.0)
Ln Hourly Wage ($1979) 6.2 (0.6) 6.1 (0.5) 6.5 (0.6)
Married 47.8 (50.0) 45.4 (49.8) 54.2 (49.8)
College 27.8 (44.8)
Experience 8.1 (5.2) 8.4 (5.3) 7.5 (4.9)
Tenure 3.5 (3.5) 3.5 (3.5) 3.7 (3.5)
Career Tenure 4.8 (4.2) 4.6 (4.2) 5.1 (4.2)
Math Tenure 4.8 (4.2) 4.7 (4.2) 5.0 (4.1)
Verbal Tenure 4.7 (4.2) 4.7 (4.2) 4.9 (4.1)
Science Tenure 5.0 (4.3) 4.9 (4.3) 5.1 (4.1)
Technical Tenure 4.9 (4.2) 4.8 (4.3) 5.0 (4.1)
Math Eqv. Tenure 2.3 (2.3) 2.1 (2.1) 2.9 (2.6)
Verbal Eqv. Tenure 2.4 (2.4) 2.2 (2.2) 3.1 (2.7)
Science Eqv. Tenure 2.0 (2.0) 1.9 (1.9) 2.3 (2.1)
Technical Eqv. Tenure 2.3 (2.3) 2.2 (2.3) 2.5 (2.3)
Old Job 62.4 (48.5) 60.8 (48.8) 66.3 (47.3)
Employer Change 26.7 (44.2) 28.3 (45.0) 22.6 (41.8)
Career Change 15.4 (36.1) 17.1 (37.6) 11.0 (31.3)
Math Change 14.0 (34.7) 15.3 (36.0) 10.5 (30.7)
Verbal Change 14.1 (34.8) 15.4 (36.1) 10.8 (31.0)
Science Change 12.7 (33.3) 13.8 (34.5) 9.7 (29.6)
Technical Change 13.5 (34.1) 14.8 (35.5) 10.1 (30.1)
O*net Math 47.4 (17.7) 44.2 (16.9) 55.8 (17.1)
O*net Verbal 50.4 (18.4) 46.5 (17.7) 60.5 (15.9)
O*net Science 40.5 (16.2) 38.5 (15.4) 45.5 (17.1)
O*net Technical 46.6 (19.6) 45.9 (19.4) 48.3 (20.2)
Observations 23,951 17,284 6,667
Individuals 2,057 1,428 629
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: NLSY. Males aged 14-22 in 1979. For detailed definitions see text.
years old are also removed from the sample. The total number of individuals remaining
in the sample is 2,057 (see Table 1.1).
Annual wages are only recorded every other year since 1994, in contrast to the
continuous weekly employment status variables. Thus, approximately 28 percent of
wage observations are missing. Unlike Pavan (2011), I exclude all observations with
missing wages, which reduces the sample (see Table 1.1). The highest and lowest 10
wage observations are removed as an additional insurance against outliers. Hourly
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Table 1.2: Sample Wage Growth Summary: Less than College
VARIABLES Mean (Std. Dev.) N
5-Year Experience 22.9 (54.3) 3,384
10-Year Experience 39.0 (62.3) 2,852
5-Year Firm Tenure 14.7 (40) 2,867
10-Year Firm Tenure 27.9 (43.6) 865
5-Year Career Tenure 18.6 (42.4) 3,365
10-Year Career Tenure 31.7 (49.7) 1,440
Source: NLSY. Males aged 14-22 in 1979. For detailed definitions see text.
wages are deflated using the Consumer Price Index deflator to produce consistent 1979
US dollar values.
Individuals are sorted into two broad educational attainment categories, “LTC”
(less than college) and “C+” (college degree or above). Given the time it takes to
graduate from college, the college sample is slightly older and has less labor market
experience on average. However, years of tenure at a given firm and career tenure are
both larger for college graduates. Consequently, the fraction of observations recorded
as employer and career changes is smaller for college graduates. I.e., while 17 percent
of the non-college graduate observations record a career change, only 11 percent of
college graduate observations are classed as career changes.
The usual tenure measures are mostly self-explanatory, such as total labor market
experience (“experience”). Additionally, I make use of two tenure measures of skill,
a “Skill Tenure” and “Skill Equivalent Tenure,” that are explained in more detail in
Section 1.2.2. Also related to tenure, “old job” refers to the share of observations that
are not new job contracts (first year).
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 summarize the experience tenure wage growth (in percent) for in-
dividuals with and without a college degree. As expected, college educated individuals
experience considerably faster wage growth than those without college degrees. Both
experience and career tenure wage growth are comparable for college graduates, with
experience dominating career tenure for non-college graduates. These results highlight
the diﬀering labor market characteristics for diﬀerent education levels. Note, in both
cases firm tenure shows the smallest wage growth.
The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) skill-specific test scores
found in the NLSY are used to assess the ex ante abilities of individuals for math,
verbal, science and technical skills.8 These tests are based on a set of standardized
tests created in WWII by the US military, which were further refined in the mid-1970s
by psychometricians who created the first computerized, adaptive tests. Additionally,
8The ASVAB was administered in 1980.
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Table 1.3: Sample Wage Growth Summary: College
VARIABLES Mean (Std. Dev.) N
5-Year Experience 32.8 (50.5) 1,490
10-Year Experience 55.2 (58.1) 1,058
5-Year Firm Tenure 23.6 (45.4) 1,268
10-Year Firm Tenure 45.6 (46.9) 388
5-Year Career Tenure 30.2 (48.8) 1,470
10-Year Career Tenure 55.2 (57.1) 663
Source: NLSY. Males aged 14-22 in 1979. For detailed definitions see text.
the ASVAB tests’ multiple skill dimensions can be turned into composite scores, for
career placement purposes. For example, these tests have been used by high schools
to assist career counselors. To strengthen the applicability of the ASVAB, the US
government had 26 occupational descriptors from the O*net database mapped into
seven ASVAB test types by the ASVAB Career Exploration Program.9 Thus, the skill
definitions of the ASVAB scores are useful in understanding the human capital skill
groups presented in Section 1.2.2. Thus, the seven ASVAB test scores can be mapped
into the following four broad categories of skills:
 Math: arithmetic reasoning and mathematics knowledge;
 Verbal: word knowledge and paragraph comprehension;
 Science: general science knowledge; and
 Technical: auto and shop, mechanical comprehension and electronics information.
1.2.2 Occupational Information Network (O*net)
The O*net database contains detailed descriptive information about more than 900
occupations, and succeeds the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Whereas the
DOT is based on direct expert observations of occupations, the O*net sends ques-
tionnaires to a random sample of workers based on their occupations. Each worker
completes one-quarter of the questions, which are organized into eight broad cate-
gories. Three categories are of particular interest: knowledge, skills and ability, as they
provide a natural mapping into math, verbal, technical and science skill groups. This
mapping is defined within the O*net and is computed using the database information.
These three broad categories cover multiple information areas.
9The ASVAB Career Exploration Program is sponsored by the Department of Defense, with
details on the O*net to ASVAB mapping procedure found in their online technical appendix,
www.asvabprogram.com/downloads/Technical_Chapter_2010.pdf.
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1. Knowledge: Biology, Building and Construction, Chemistry, Computers and
Electronics, Engineering and Technology, English Language, Mathematics, Me-
chanical, Physics
2. Skills: Equipment Maintenance, Equipment Selection, Installation, Mathematics,
Operation and Control, Reading Comprehension, Repairing, Science, Technology
Design
3. Ability: Trouble Shooting, Deductive Reasoning, Inductive Reasoning, Informa-
tion Ordering, Mathematical Reasoning, Number Facility, Oral Comprehension,
Written Comprehension
As the four human capital skill groups (math, verbal, science and technical) are
based on three broad O*net categories, the O*net does not provide a clean definition
of the derived skill groups. However, the O*net created these skill groups to be directly
comparable to the ASVAB test scores found in the NLSY (see Section 1.2.1).
The O*net point scales range from zero to five or seven, depending on the cate-
gory. To ensure consistency and comparability, these values are rescaled to the interval
[0,100]. Table 1.1 summarizes the O*net skill measures for the NLSY sample. College
graduates tend to work in much higher math and verbal requirement occupations than
non-college graduates. Comparing the same groups, the average diﬀerence in occupa-
tion science requirements is slightly smaller and the diﬀerence in terms of technical
skills is the smallest, suggesting the latter two could represent more general skills used
in unskilled occupations.
The two tenure measures of skill previously mentioned in Section 1.2.1, “Skill
Tenure” and “Skill Equivalent Tenure,” are used in the empirical analysis below. While
the first simply tracks how many years an individual worked in a given skill group (addi-
tional details will be provided below), the latter tracks the level of skill used/accumulated
over time. For computation of the “skill tenure” variables in Table 1.1 the O*net vari-
ables are grouped into 10 equally spaced bins to avoid coding minor skill changes into
significant career changes.10 Thus, an occupation is defined by the four skill types
(math, verbal, technical and science), from which they can be further sorted into bins
based on the level of each skill required (see Section 1.2.3).
1.2.3 Career Definitions
To accurately capture various dimensions of tenure, I use a similar methodology
employed by Parent (2000), Pavan (2011) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b), who
10Robustness checks with more bins, e.g., 20 bins, yield similar results.
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note that spurious occupational changes are observed when only using the occupation
census code to define a career change.11 Thus, I define four tenure variables:
1. Experience: the total labor market tenure for an individual, accounting for em-
ployment gaps, defined by the employment status variables in the NLSY.
2. Firm: the total firm-specific tenure for an individual, including possible occupa-
tional changes while working within the same firm, defined by the employment
status and employer identifier variables in the NLSY.
3. Career: the total occupation-specific tenure for an individual, defined by the
employment status, employer identifier, industry and occupation census codes in
the NLSY.
4. Career (Skills): the total occupation-specific tenure for an individual, defined by
the employment status and employer identifier from the NLSY, combined with
a single skill bin change. This, by definition, means that the occupational code
must also change, although this is only a necessary condition.
Definitions one through three are identical to previous studies. Category four is only
now possible given O*net skill measures. Category four is, by definition, a subset
of category three. For example, no occupational change would be recorded under this
career definition for an individual switching between two very similar occupations where
none of the skill dimensions change substantially. In contrast, an occupational change
would be recorded under this career definition for an individual switching between two
occupations where the new occupation exhibits a significant change in at least one of
the four skill dimensions (e.g., math). If only the math skill moves to a new bins, then
a career change in math is recorded, but the other skills would continue as before. This
is further illustrated in the summary statistics of Table 1.1 where skill changes are less
likely than career changes, with science career changes being the least likely.
I only focus on continuous employment spells,12 meaning individuals returning to
an occupation will reset their occupation-specific human capital levels to zero, whereas
Parent (2000) includes human capital accumulation for non-continuous employment
spells (i.e., when an individual returns to an occupation, they resume their human
capital accumulation from the previous level, rather than from zero). The assumptions
underlying continuous employment spells are consistent with the idea of depreciating
human capital, proposed by Mincer and Polachek (1974) and further expanded upon
by (Rendall and Rendall, 2015, and references therein).
11Sullivan (2010) uses a change in the NLSY reporting starting in 1994 to refine his definitions of
tenure such that only occupation code changes can be used to signal a career switch.
12Results for non-continuous spells are similar in magnitude (slightly larger) and statistical signifi-
cance to the continuous spell results. Non-continuous spell results are available upon request.
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Lastly, experience and tenure measures are yearly observations given the limited
wage information in the sample. I follow Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) in only
incrementing tenure variables by one additional year if the individual worked at least
800 hours during the prior calendar year in the given firm/occupation. If the individual
works less than 800 hours, the tenure variable remains at the prior year’s level until a
firm or career change occurs.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Earnings Function Estimation
To assess the relationship between wages and tenure, I estimate variations of,
ln wifct = 0expit + 1OJift + 2ftenift + 3ctenict + it : (1.1)
On the left-hand side, ln wifct is the natural log of hourly wages ($1979) for individual
i in period t, with firm f and career c. On the right-hand side, exp is total labor
market experience, OJ (“old job”) is a dummy variable equal to one when firm tenure
is greater than one, ften is firm tenure and cten is career tenure. OJ is included to
account for any non-linear eﬀect of firm-specific tenure during the first year, such as an
initially high rate of on-the-job learning. In addition, any non-linearity in experience
and tenure will additionally by captured by squared and cubed terms of the exp, ften,
and cten variables. Variables that capture specific occupational characteristics, such as
industry and occupation codes, are also included, but vary by regression specification
and are discussed in-detail in Section 1.3.2. Other variables in Equation (1.1) includes
an intercept term, a union dummy, marital status dummies,13 year dummies, region
dummies, education dummies,14 race dummy,15 and four ASVAB skill-specific test
scores (math, verbal, science and technical) as a measure of innate ability.16
The variables that are not included in Equation (1.1) are either unobserved or not
cleanly reported. These include individual-specific charateristics, such as motivation,
13marital status dummies are: married, never married and other
14Degree dummies are: high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, college graduate
and post-graduate degree.
15Dummy variable equals one if an individual is black.
16The ASVAB skill-specific test scores are reported for each individual. Previous studies do not
include an innate ability measure, as they explicitly state that such a measure is a fixed eﬀect contained
in the error term (e.g., Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009b). The results presented in this paper are
consistent with this interpretation, with very similar results when including and excluding the ASVAB
scores. Results without the ASVAB scores are available upon request.
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and firm-/career-worker match quality measurements. Thus,
it = i + if + ic + it ; (1.2)
where i is the individual eﬀect, if is the firm-worker match eﬀect, ic is the career-
worker match eﬀect and it is the usual error term.
Proceeding with Equation (1.1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) is problematic
because it is probable that unobserved components are correlated with the observed
variables, such as tenure and experience. For example, individuals with large i terms
might be favored in the labor market and thus exhibit higher quality firm- and career-
worker matches. Similarly, higher if and ic may indicate better employment matches,
leading to longer tenure and higher wages. I address this endogenity issue using the
instrumental variables (IV) approach developed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987).17
Specifically looking at one career spell for individual i with tenure Xict, I calculate
the average tenure during that career spell as X ic. Thus, the instrumental variable
for tenure can be computed as, X^ict = Xict  X ic, with the squared and cubed tenure
instrumental variables similarly computed. By construction, these IVs are orthogonal
to the career-match component, i.e., the endogeneity between wages and career-worker
match quality is removed. For completeness, I also instrument firm tenure, labor force
experience and the OJ dummy using their respective spell-specific means. Lastly, as the
NLSY is a panel dataset, I estimate the instrumented model using the generalized least
squares (GLS) approach to account for the serial correlation of individual error terms.
Results are provided for both OLS and IV-GLS for comparison purposes, although the
IV-GLS results are preferred for the reasons detailed above.
1.3.2 Empirical Results
Three regression specifications are estimated using Equation (1.1) as a basis, each
diﬀering in terms of career definition.
1. This specification is the basic regression from the literature, where career tenure
is defined by the NLSY 3-digit occupation and industry census codes.
2. Using the basic regression from specification 1, I make a simple change to the
career tenure definition to include the previously defined four O*net human cap-
ital skills (math, verbal, science and technical). This specification allocates the
human capital skills for each occupation into 10 equally spaced bins from lowest
skill requirements to highest. When an individual enters a new occupation, the
17This approach is also used by Parent (2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b), with Sullivan
(2010) using a similar methodology.
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bins for the four skills for the old and new occupation are compared. Career
changes are tracked by skills separately. A bin change for any skill is registered
as a skill-specific career change. For example, assume an individual works in
occupation A, with skill percentile ranks of 35, 49, 71 and 44 percent for math,
verbal, science and technical skills, respectively. The career tenure identification
uses the following bins, respectively: 4, 5, 8 and 5. Now assume this individual’s
occupation code changes to occupation B with the following skill percentile ranks,
respectively: 39, 49, 79 and 41. As the bins for occupation A and B are identical,
no career change is registered for any skill. Now assume this individual switches
from occupation B to C with the following skill percentile ranks, respectively: 41,
49, 79 and 39. This switch will trigger a career change in math, as the math bin
changed from 4 to 5. It will also trigger a career change in technical skills, as the
individual moves from bin 5 to 4. However, no career change will be recorded for
verbal and science skills. The career tenure measure continues to track years in
this specification. That is, two individuals that work at least 800 hours in their
respective math bins 10 consecutive years, will have both accumulated 10 years
of math tenure, even though one may be working in bin 1 and the other in bin 5.
3. To further refine the idea of skill-specific tenure, specification 3 accounts for the
accumulation of specific skills based on both the length of occupational employ-
ment and the skill level used. Using the same NLSY 3-digit occupation and
industry codes to define career tenure from specification 1, I add four skill equiv-
alent tenure measures, defined as: stenic =
Pt
=1 skillict  1(hours800), for math,
verbal, science and technical skills in current career c. For example, the math
skill equivalent tenure measure for an individual employed three years in career
A, which uses a 0:35 math skill level for the first two years and then (after a
promotion) uses 0:4, would be: 1:1 = (1  0:35) + (1  0:35) + (1  0:4). That
is, even though the math content may change, it is not considered a new career
as it happens within the firm (see definition 1), which is consistent with career
changes in the current literature. This measure simply addresses the idea that ca-
reer tenure might have diﬀerent importance for diﬀerent levels of skills (Sullivan,
2010).
Thus, the three specifications can be thought of as: (1) the standard regression specifi-
cation from the literature; (2) a simple revision of the standard regression specification
from the literature to include human capital skill types; and (3) the basic regression
from the literature, but with an interacted human capital skill experience measure.
Note that the results for specification 2 and 3 share the same human capital skill
labels, although they have diﬀerent definitions.
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Table 1.4: OLS Estimation Results
VARIABLES Base Skill Skill Equivalent
(1) (2) (3)
Experience 0.041*** (0.006) 0.042*** (0.007) 0.038*** (0.006)
Experience2  100 -0.220*** (0.068) -0.227*** (0.072) -0.209*** (0.069)
Experience3  100 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002)
Old Job 0.000 (0.010) -0.001 (0.011) 0.002 (0.010)
Firm Tenure 0.007 (0.004) 0.012*** (0.005) -0.000 (0.005)
Firm Tenure2  100 -0.042 (0.027) -0.071** (0.029) -0.037 (0.028)
Career Tenure 0.077*** (0.006) 0.073*** (0.007)
Career Tenure2  100 -0.530*** (0.076) -0.574*** (0.087)
Career Tenure3  100 0.014*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.003)
M Tenure 0.013 (0.013) 0.003 (0.019)
M Tenure2  100 0.009 (0.168) 0.277 (0.389)
M Tenure3  100 -0.002 (0.006) -0.011 (0.021)
V Tenure 0.028** (0.012) -0.033* (0.017)
V Tenure2  100 -0.325** (0.158) 0.581* (0.326)
V Tenure3  100 0.009 (0.006) -0.026 (0.017)
S Tenure 0.010 (0.012) 0.042** (0.021)
S Tenure2  100 -0.042 (0.156) -0.773 (0.497)
S Tenure3  100 0.001 (0.006) 0.035 (0.032)
T Tenure 0.022** (0.011) 0.036** (0.014)
T Tenure2  100 -0.155 (0.146) -0.382 (0.272)
T Tenure3  100 0.006 (0.005) 0.013 (0.014)
Observations 24,091 24,049 23,929
R-squared 0.367 0.347 0.359
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
All regressions include dummies for years, 1-digit industry dummies, race (Black or Other),
region, marital status (married, never married, and other), union membership, and last school
degree (high school drop out, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post-
college graduate). Regression (1) also includes 1-digit occupation dummies, while regressions
(2) and (3) include the four O*net skill requirements by occupation (math, verbal, science, and
technical).
Table 1.4 provides OLS estimates for all regression specifications. Looking at the
results for specification 1, both labor market experience and career tenure are impor-
tant and statistically significant at the one percent level. Specification 2 gives nearly
identical results for experience, but now attributes the remaining wage eﬀects to ver-
bal and, to a lesser degree, technical skills. Specification 3 matches the experience and
career tenure estimates found in specification 1, but now highlights science, technical
21
Table 1.5: IV-GLS Estimation Results
VARIABLES Base Skill Skill Equivalent
(1) (2) (3)
Experience 0.090*** (0.007) 0.087*** (0.007) 0.179*** (0.018)
Experience2  100 -0.417*** (0.055) -0.371*** (0.057) -0.356*** (0.054)
Experience3  100 0.008*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002)
Old Job -0.028*** (0.009) -0.034*** (0.010) -0.031*** (0.009)
Firm Tenure -0.012*** (0.004) -0.013*** (0.004) -0.028*** (0.004)
Firm Tenure2  100 0.009 (0.024) 0.011 (0.025) 0.055** (0.025)
Career Tenure 0.044*** (0.006) 0.000 (0.008)
Career Tenure2  100 -0.343*** (0.068) -0.098 (0.082)
Career Tenure3  100 0.009*** (0.002) 0.004 (0.003)
M Tenure 0.015 (0.011) 0.051*** (0.016)
M Tenure2  100 -0.068 (0.133) -0.512 (0.331)
M Tenure3  100 0.000 (0.005) 0.027 (0.019)
V Tenure 0.016 (0.011) 0.025* (0.015)
V Tenure2  100 -0.198 (0.133) -0.010 (0.289)
V Tenure3  100 0.007 (0.005) -0.002 (0.016)
S Tenure 0.020* (0.011) 0.033* (0.017)
S Tenure2  100 -0.143 (0.131) -0.780** (0.386)
S Tenure3  100 0.002 (0.005) 0.029 (0.024)
T Tenure 0.005 (0.010) 0.055*** (0.013)
T Tenure2  100 -0.053 (0.129) -0.594*** (0.227)
T Tenure3  100 0.004 (0.005) 0.020* (0.012)
Observations 24,091 24,049 23,929
Individuals 2,052 2,052 2,048
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
See notes Table 1.4 and text for details.
and verbal skill equivalent tenure as the drivers of wages. The estimates indicate that
firm tenure is not a particularly important wage determinant, and is only statistically
significant under specification 2. Note that these results are broadly consistent with
the previous literature. For example, Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) also find rela-
tively large and statistically significant results for labor market experience under OLS,
despite using diﬀerent underlying data. However, it is important to note that these
OLS results are provided as a link to previous research results, and are not indicative
of the actual relationship between wage and tenure measures for reasons detailed in
Section 1.3.1.
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Table 1.5 provides IV-GLS estimates for all regression specifications. Reviewing the
coeﬃcient estimates for specification 1 shows that experience, firm and career tenure
all have large and statistically significant wage eﬀects, although the firm tenure wage
eﬀect is negative. This result is similar Sullivan (2010) who finds a negative firm
and large positive occupation tenure eﬀect for professional-level workers, both being
statistically significant. Specification 2 reduces the relative impact of labor market
experience and finds relatively small and statistically insignificant coeﬃcients on the
human capital skill measures. Specification 3 produces the strongest results across
the board, with experience, firm tenure, math and technical skill equivalent tenure
having a substantial and statistically significant eﬀect on wages. The robust results of
specification 3 are intuitive, given that the skill equivalent tenure measures more closely
align with the definition of skill accumulation. I.e., the longer an individual works in a
particular occupation, the more skill-specific experience they accumulate. However, the
accumulation of tenure (or learning-by-doing) matters more the higher the skill content
of the job (See Sullivan, 2010). For example, working in the lowest math occupation
(skill level of zero) would add nothing in terms of wages, even with more tenure, while
working in the highest math occupation (skill level one) would make math tenure highly
important for wage growth over the life-cycle. Similarly to the OLS results presented,
many of the IV-GLS results are broadly consistent with the relevant NLSY-based IV-
GLS estimates found in the literature. For example, Parent (2000) finds a one year
labor market experience wage eﬀect of about 13 percent, compared to 18 percent in
specification 3 of this study. However, the results of this study diverge considerably
from previous work when skill measures are included, with large, statistically significant
coeﬃcients for both math and technical skills under specification 3. In comparison,
both verbal and science skills exhibit much smaller coeﬃcients that are less statistically
significant.
1.3.3 Discussion
Since the returns to tenure are non-linear, I provide returns to tenure for 2, 5 and 10
years for three sample groups: all individuals (Table 1.6), individuals without a college
degree (Table 1.7) and individuals with a college degree (Table 1.8). Table 1.6 uses
the IV-GLS results presented in Section 1.3.2, whereas Tables 1.7 and 1.8 are based on
separate IV-GLS estimates for each sub-sample (see Appendix A.1).
Looking at the results for all individuals (Table 1.6) under specification 1, five years
of firm tenure leads to a decrease in wages of 8.5 percent. Sullivan (2010) calculates a
similar five year value for firm tenure at -6 percent under a similar specification, but
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Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) find firm tenure to have neglible wage eﬀects.18
Counteracting this is a positive career tenure value, with five years of career tenure
associated with 15 percent higher wages. Sullivan calculates about 18 percent wage
growth for the same career tenure. Specification 2 exhibits similar returns to firm
tenure as specification 1, but identifies math and science skill tenure as the primary
wage drivers. However, specification 2 does not provide the statistical significance re-
quired to fully commit to the estimated returns for skill tenure. Specification 3 points
to a significant negative eﬀect for both firm and career tenure, with 10 years of tenure
leading to a reduction of average wages by 26 and 6 percent for specification 3, respec-
tively. The specification 3 skill equivalent tenure returns assume an individual working
in the highest (100th percentile) occupation for the specified skill. For example, an in-
dividual working in an occupation with the highest math requirement (e.g., physicist)
will see a wage increase of 27 percent over ten years, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, an
individual working in an occupation at the 50th math percentile will experience wage
growth over 10 years that is equivalent to the 5 year tenure returns reported (i.e., 16
percent). For comparison, an individual working in the bottom math skill occupation
will experience no wage growth related to tenure within that career path. Thus, math,
verbal and technical skill equivalent tenure push wages significantly higher. Since Table
1.1 suggests that non-college graduates and college-graduates select into occupations
with very diﬀerent skill requirements, I further explore skill-specific tenure returns
using these two broad educational categories. In order to compute education-specific
returns, IV-GLS estimates were produced for both college and non-college sub-samples.
The returns to tenure by education group are reported and discussed below.
Investigating the returns to tenure for individuals without a college degree requires
estimating Equation (1.1) using IV-GLS using the relevant sub-sample of the NLSY.
The calculated returns from this process are shown in Table 1.7. Specification 1 shows
a similar negative eﬀect for firm tenure as the full NLSY sample, with a somewhat
less positive estimate for career tenure. Specification 2 focuses attention on math and
science skills, although neither are statistically significant. Specification 3 depicts the
most interesting results for those without a college degree. As with the full NLSY sam-
ple, firm and career tenure have a strong negative and statistically significant impact.
However, in contrast to the full NLSY sample, technical and verbal skill equivalent
tenure have the strongest positive impact on wages. Math continues to be an impor-
tant positive determinant of wages, but science is not statistically significant, although
it exhibits a large negative impact (i.e., -27 percent for 10 years of science skill equiv-
18Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) reports firm tenure wage eﬀects similar to those of Altonji
and Williams (2005) (i.e., small/neglible), who attempt to reconcile the diﬀering firm tenure wage
eﬀects reported in Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991).
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Table 1.6: IV-GLS Returns to Tenure, All Individuals
VARIABLES Base Skill Skill Equivalent
(1) (2) (3)
Firm: 2 years -0.052*** (0.009) -0.059*** (0.009) -0.085*** (0.010)
Firm: 5 years -0.085*** (0.014) -0.094*** (0.015) -0.157*** (0.016)
Firm: 10 years -0.137*** (0.020) -0.149*** (0.022) -0.255*** (0.023)
Career: 2 years 0.075*** (0.010) -0.004 (0.013)
Career: 5 years 0.147*** (0.017) -0.020 (0.023)
Career: 10 years 0.191*** (0.020) -0.061* (0.029)
Math: 2 years 0.027 (0.017) 0.084*** (0.022)
Math: 5 years 0.058* (0.029) 0.162*** (0.030)
Math: 10 years 0.084* (0.033) 0.271*** (0.043)
Verbal: 2 years 0.025 (0.017) 0.050* (0.020)
Verbal: 5 years 0.041 (0.030) 0.122*** (0.030)
Verbal: 10 years 0.035 (0.034) 0.226*** (0.044)
Science: 2 years 0.035* (0.017) 0.037 (0.022)
Science: 5 years 0.069* (0.029) 0.006 (0.031)
Science: 10 years 0.078* (0.034) -0.158** (0.060)
Technical: 2 years 0.008 (0.016) 0.088*** (0.018)
Technical: 5 years 0.015 (0.028) 0.152*** (0.028)
Technical: 10 years 0.031 (0.032) 0.157*** (0.039)
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Returns to tenure are computed from regression results Table 1.5.
alent tenure). Therefore, for individuals without a college degree, a career in a highly
technical or highly verbal occupation generates the largest possible wage gains over
their working life.
The returns to tenure presented in Table 1.8 come from the same process as those
in Table 1.7, except the NLSY sub-sample contains those with college degrees only.
Under specification 1, firm tenure’s estimated 10 year eﬀect is -17 percent, whereas the
equivalent career tenure eﬀect is 27 percent - oﬀsetting the negative firm tenure eﬀect.
Specification 2 links the similar negative eﬀect of firm tenure with relatively large math
and science skill eﬀects, at 14 and 17 percent for 10 year tenure, respectively. However,
these eﬀects are only statistically significant at 10 percent. Turning to specification 3,
we see that math skill equivalent tenure returns are very large for college graduates,
e.g., 25 percent for 10 years tenure at the 100th math percentile occupation. This
relationship is statistically significant at the one percent level and is significantly larger
than the other skills. Science skill equivalent tenure return for 10 years employment
in a 100th percentile science occupation is 22 percent, but the statistical significance
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Table 1.7: IV-GLS Returns to Tenure, Less Than College
VARIABLES Base Skill Skill Equivalent
(1) (2) (3)
Firm: 2 years -0.047*** (0.010) -0.050*** (0.011) -0.078*** (0.012)
Firm: 5 years -0.075*** (0.016) -0.081*** (0.018) -0.144*** (0.019)
Firm: 10 years -0.122*** (0.023) -0.133*** (0.025) -0.237*** (0.027)
Career: 2 years 0.060*** (0.011) -0.013 (0.014)
Career: 5 years 0.114*** (0.019) -0.038 (0.026)
Career: 10 years 0.143*** (0.023) -0.082* (0.033)
Math: 2 years 0.021 (0.019) 0.094*** (0.026)
Math: 5 years 0.044 (0.033) 0.145*** (0.036)
Math: 10 years 0.055 (0.038) 0.186** (0.059)
Verbal: 2 years 0.017 (0.019) 0.029 (0.024)
Verbal: 5 years 0.028 (0.033) 0.108** (0.035)
Verbal: 10 years 0.027 (0.038) 0.276*** (0.058)
Science: 2 years 0.036 (0.019) 0.052* (0.025)
Science: 5 years 0.063 (0.032) -0.002 (0.036)
Science: 10 years 0.055 (0.037) -0.269*** (0.077)
Technical: 2 years 0.000 (0.018) 0.084*** (0.020)
Technical: 5 years 0.008 (0.031) 0.178*** (0.031)
Technical: 10 years 0.043 (0.036) 0.280*** (0.046)
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
NLSY (males aged 14-22 in 1979). Returns to tenure are computed from regression results
Table A.1.
only reaches the 10 percent level. Verbal skills seem to matter, but only in the first few
years before the eﬀect vanishes, while technical skills have no wage returns to tenure.
The main eﬀects of including human capital skill tenure returns can be easily seen
when viewing the results separately for college and non-college workers. Concentrating
on specification 3, as this specification provides the most intuitive skill accumulation
definition, there are significant diﬀerences between college and non-college education
groups’ tenure returns. While both groups see significant wage decreases with firm
tenure, they experience wage growth through diﬀerent skill channels. Specifically, non-
college workers benefit most from skill equivalent tenure in technical and verbal human
capital skill areas, and to a lesser extent math. This result diverges from the results
for college graduates, where math and science skill equivalent tenure yields the largest
positive wage eﬀect. For college graduates, technical skill equivalent tenure yields no
wage eﬀect, with verbal skills becoming insignificant over time, both in terms of size
and statistical significance.
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Table 1.8: IV-GLS Returns to Tenure, College
VARIABLES Base Skill Skill Equivalent
(1) (2) (3)
Firm: 2 years -0.062*** (0.016) -0.080*** (0.018) -0.092*** (0.018)
Firm: 5 years -0.105*** (0.025) -0.129*** (0.028) -0.162*** (0.029)
Firm: 10 years -0.166*** (0.035) -0.190*** (0.039) -0.249*** (0.041)
Career: 2 years 0.120*** (0.019) 0.017 (0.029)
Career: 5 years 0.227*** (0.033) 0.030 (0.052)
Career: 10 years 0.267*** (0.039) 0.023 (0.063)
Math: 2 years 0.043 (0.033) 0.082* (0.041)
Math: 5 years 0.090 (0.056) 0.160** (0.059)
Math: 10 years 0.137* (0.062) 0.254*** (0.072)
Verbal: 2 years 0.043 (0.036) 0.108** (0.042)
Verbal: 5 years 0.068 (0.061) 0.126* (0.062)
Verbal: 10 years 0.031 (0.071) 0.020 (0.078)
Science: 2 years 0.038 (0.037) 0.011 (0.047)
Science: 5 years 0.089 (0.062) 0.083 (0.068)
Science: 10 years 0.166* (0.070) 0.215* (0.110)
Technical: 2 years 0.034 (0.035) 0.059 (0.041)
Technical: 5 years 0.044 (0.058) 0.063 (0.062)
Technical: 10 years -0.009 (0.064) -0.093 (0.085)
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Returns to tenure are computed from regression results Table A.2.
1.4 Conclusion
Much of the previous literature linking tenure and wages concentrated on three areas
of advancement: understanding the wage setting incentives, the estimation methods
employed, and the measurement of tenure itself. This paper moves this literature
forward by including nuanced numerical measures of human capital skill accumulation
covering math, verbal, science and technical skills within the framework employed by a
large part of the existing literature relevant to the topic, using the favored estimation
methodology.
The results redefine the wage-tenure relationship along one significant dimension:
careers. Previous estimates concentrate on separating the firm, industry and occupa-
tion tenure wage eﬀects. While I use some similar definitions, I can separate the entire
career tenure eﬀect into four skill equivalent tenure areas. These four skill areas are not
uniformly important for all workers. Workers without a college degree experience the
largest wage growth through the accumulation of technical and verbal skill equivalent
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tenure, with math being of third-order importance. College graduates benefit most
from accumulating math and science skill equivalent tenure, but experience virtually
no eﬀect from verbal skill equivalent tenure.
The current analysis follows the strict definition of career changes previously em-
ployed in the literature. I do this in order to use similar samples (time periods and
individuals) to estimate the newly defined skill-career tenure eﬀects and make the re-
sults comparable to the broader literature. However, as Sullivan (2010) points out, a
change in the variable collection process of the NLSY in 1994 now allows for the iden-
tification of career changes within a given firm. In future research I plan on extending
the current set of results to account, not only for the eﬀects of skill-tenure when mov-
ing from employer to employer, but also the eﬀect of skill-tenure when staying with a
current employer.
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2 Women and Careers: Skill-Specific Atro-
phy and Repair
Joint with Michelle Rendall
2.1 Introduction
The gender wage gap is a persistent characteristic of the US labor market. Although
it has narrowed significantly between 1970 and 2010, research suggests that it will not
disappear for a number of reasons. Favored explanations generally focus on female-
male diﬀerences in bargaining, fertility, and preferences across occupations (see Goldin,
2014, and references therein). In this paper, we focus on the idea that women and
men have diﬀerent economic valuations (preferences) over human capital types, which
is underpinned by their employment expectations. The subsequent specific capital
accumulation leads to an occupation gap between men and women that is surprisingly
robust.1
The precise mechanism underpinning the diﬀerences between female and male oc-
cupational choices is still under debate. The traditional model (Roy, 1951) suggests
that individuals choose occupations that maximize their skill returns. However, this
model cannot explain the large labor market gender diﬀerences observed, including
occupational choices over the life-cycle. Thus, the basic question is: How do women
(men) choose occupations?
Hsieh et al. (2013) provides detailed statistics underlining the observed female-
male occupational diﬀerences, along with the closing (but still existing) gender gap
in occupational choice. The authors argue that the misallocation of talent from 1960
to today has shrunk, as frictions in both the labor market and schooling choices have
decreased. They model both frictions as taxes that diminish over time based on changes
in occupational barriers, the distribution of talent and occupation-specific technical
change. However, even with a decrease in these frictions, the occupational gender gap
is still significant today. More specifically, the occupation similarity index (see Table 1
in Hsieh et al., 2013), where zero denotes no overlap and one denotes a perfect overlap
1Although occupational diﬀerences across gender have diminished rapidly, the pace of convergence
has slowed recently.
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with the occupational distribution of white men, increases from 0.38 to 0.59 from 1980
to 2008 for higher educated white women and from 0.40 to 0.46 for lower educated
women. Thus, while men and women have similar ex ante abilities (Goldin et al.,
2006), women self-select into vastly diﬀerent occupations compared to men. Goldin
(2014) suggests that the penalty attributed to part time work or the inflexibility of
work schedules of certain occupations is a primary driver of occupational diﬀerences.
In the context of Hsieh et al. (2013), rigid work schedules are a friction that has yet to
be overcome.
We propose a mechanism that is complimentary to Hsieh et al. (2013) and Goldin
(2014), and consistent with the large skill-biased technical change literature. Tech-
nological innovation in the last few decades has been exceptionally fast by historical
standards, especially within the ICT sector. Some skills may be more exposed to this
innovation than others. That is, as technology moves forward, certain skills may be-
come obsolete more quickly. If women are more likely to take career breaks, e.g., for
child bearing/rearing, they may optimally choose occupations that exhibit less skill-
obsolescences if they experience work gaps. Therefore, we explore if certain types of
skills are more likely to become obsolete in the labor market after career breaks.
This idea follows from the large literature explaining occupational choices through
human capital characteristics. The gender dimension is first explored by Mincer and
Polachek (1974) who theorize that women acquire human capital taking into account
their expectations regarding family formation and future labor market attachment.
The authors estimate human capital depreciation rates for women from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Mature and Young Women (NLS). Polachek (1981) takes the
generalized depreciating human capital concept and allows for occupation-specific skill
depreciation, with the author concluding that occupational choice is related to the pe-
riod of time spent out of the labor force. McDowell (1982) similarly notes that women
tend to avoid fields where knowledge depreciates quickly (is non-durable) and this se-
lection bias is correlated with aggregate fertility patterns. Mincer and Ofek (1982) find
evidence of wage “rebound” when estimating income losses from labor market with-
drawal and re-entry. They hypothesize that this wage rebound is actually a form of
“repairing” or relearning previously depreciated human capital, based on the assump-
tion that relearning skills is less costly than learning a task for the first time. Additional
support comes from Lazear and Rosen (1990), who suggest women are passed up for
promotions within the same “narrow” jobs due to a lack of firm-specific human capital,
possibly due to career interruptions.
The previous literature, due to a lack of data availability, used occupation labels
(e.g., lawyer, nurse) or the share of women within an occupation to diﬀerentiate between
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male and female human capital types.2 Given new data sources, this study focuses on
gender diﬀerences in the demand and supply of specific skills such as mathematics and
language. That is, we expand on the literature by analyzing whether women choose
certain occupations because of skill-specific atrophy and repair rates. Although ex ante
women possess similar abilities to males, women will potentially prefer lower paying
occupations when maximizing expected lifetime income because the skills required
in these occupations have small absolute depreciation rates.3 Depreciation rates are
especially important for women who expect employment gaps (e.g., child-rearing). For
example, Adda et al. (2012) build a model where fertility aﬀects career paths through
initial occupational decisions. The authors study how German women make career
choices within the apprenticeship system, given that these women will make fertility
choices during their working years. The diﬀerence between our work and Adda et al.
(2012) is two-fold. First, we focus on occupation decisions related to certain skills
(i.e., math, verbal, science, technical skills), both for college graduates and non-college
workers. Second, we consider occupational choices throughout an individual’s life-cycle.
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to quantitatively assess whether there is a gender
bias in occupational choices based on skill requirements and to what extent varying
skill-specific atrophy-repair rates exist.
Section 2.2 starts with a short summary of the data and the basic facts concern-
ing occupational gender diﬀerences in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY) sample. Section 2.3 provides a simple model of individual occupational choice.
We use the model to derive a monetized mismatch of skill measure, based on occu-
pation requirements by gender-education groups and absolute depreciation rates. The
data analysis, Section 2.4, has two main objectives. First, we detail the gender-specific
relationships between ex ante ability and ex post occupation outcomes. We compute
the mismatch of men and women by skill type from the NLSY. Second, we document
skill-specific atrophy-repair functions from the NLSY. The NLSY is ideally suited to
compute mismatch and atrophy-repair rates, as it provides individual ability mea-
sures (e.g., math) through the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB),
along with detailed work histories. In conjunction with the NLSY, the Occupational
Information Network (O*net) provides the necessary occupation-specific skill measures.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2An occupation is classified to have female human capital if the share of female workers within
that occupation surpasses a certain threshold.
3In this study, absolute depreciation rates are defined as the depreciation of skill taking into account
potential repair rates when reentering the labor market.
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2.2 Skills and Occupations
Wemake use of two data sources, the NLSY (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979) and the O*net (Occupational Information Network) versions 4.0-9.0. These
datasets provide two unique descriptive dimensions for occupations: (1) individual
skills and wage returns to various skills in each occupation; and (2) O*net descriptors,
where occupations are diﬀerentiated by the tasks and skills they require, rather than
the ex ante abilities of individuals within those occupations.
To assess the ex ante abilities of individuals, we use the NLSY, which records
skill-specific test scores for math, verbal, science and technical skills from the ASVAB
administered in 1980 (see Appendices B.1 and B.2 for details on the data). These
tests are based on a set of standardized tests created in WWII by the US military,
which were further refined in the mid-1970s by psychometricians who created the first
computerized, adaptive tests. The ASVAB tests multiple skill dimensions, turned
into composite scores, for career placement purposes. These tests are commonly used
by high schools to assist career counselors. The NLSY cohort was tested using the
1980 version of these exams, with results for each individual providing relative skill
measures. In addition, 26 occupational descriptors from O*net have been mapped into
seven ASVAB test types by the ASVAB Career Exploration Program.4
Table 2.1 summarizes the data used in the analysis using broad education groups.5
Although individuals were interviewed from 1979 to 2010, the sample here only includes
observations after individuals graduated from their highest degree (i.e., all students are
dropped). The empirical analysis diﬀerentiates wages observations of part-time and
full-time workers., where part-time workers are individuals that worked at least 500
hours but no more than 1,400 hours in a calendar year.
In the empirical analysis we use two samples. One including all individuals with
valid occupational observations and wages, the other only including workers with sub-
stantial labor force attachment. The labor force attachment variable in Table 2.1
computes the share of individuals that spend at least 75 percent of their life-cycle (af-
ter graduating) working. Not surprisingly, this share is considerably higher for men
than women, and also larger for college graduates compared to non-college graduates.
Consistently, summary statistics on the total time spent at home (either as unemployed
or not in the labor force) are generally higher for women than men and for non-college
than college-graduates. Moreover, women not only have a higher mean number of week
4The ASVAB Career Exploration Program is sponsored by the Department of Defense; more details
on the mapping procedure can be found at www.asvabprogram.com/downloads/Technical_Chapter_
2010.pdf.
5“LTC” denotes individuals without a college degree, and “C+” denotes individuals that have
completed at least a four-year college degree.
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Table 2.1: Sample Summary Statistics
Male Female
VARIABLES LTC C+ LTC C+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 1,992 (8) 1,995 (8) 1,992 (9) 1,995 (8)
Age 31 (9) 35 (8) 32 (9) 35 (8)
Married 46 (50) 60 (49) 52 (50) 59 (49)
Graduation Year 1,979 (4) 1,985 (4) 1,980 (4) 1,985 (5)
Part-time Worker 12 (33) 8 (28) 21 (41) 17 (38)
Full-time Worker 80 (40) 87 (34) 66 (47) 74 (44)
Labor Force Attachment 75 (43) 94 (24) 56 (50) 75 (43)
Total Weeks at Home 164 (166) 207 (155) 237 (227) 226 (176)
Weeks at Home Last Year 6 (12) 3 (9) 9 (15) 5 (11)
O*net M Rank 46 (29) 65 (27) 46 (26) 62 (28)
O*net V Rank 43 (30) 65 (26) 48 (26) 66 (25)
O*net S Rank 50 (30) 61 (27) 44 (27) 58 (29)
O*net T Rank 57 (29) 58 (28) 40 (26) 52 (28)
Pre-ASVAB M Rank 43 (26) 76 (20) 43 (25) 75 (21)
Pre-ASVAB V Rank 43 (27) 74 (21) 44 (26) 72 (21)
Pre-ASVAB S Rank 45 (26) 72 (22) 44 (27) 71 (24)
Pre-ASVAB T Rank 48 (28) 67 (23) 44 (27) 67 (25)
ASVAB M Rank 45 (26) 78 (20) 41 (25) 73 (21)
ASVAB V Rank 42 (27) 72 (21) 46 (26) 73 (20)
ASVAB S Rank 49 (28) 77 (21) 40 (24) 65 (23)
ASVAB T Rank 58 (29) 77 (21) 35 (22) 54 (22)
Observations 32,839 9,444 30,720 9,147
Individuals 2,123 661 2,176 694
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
Source: NLSY. Females and males aged 14-22 in 1979. For detailed definitions see text.
gaps, but also a larger standard deviation, especially when comparing weeks out of the
labor force within the last year.
Given the ASVAB Career Exploration Program mapping between O*net descriptors
and ASVAB test scores, the diﬀerence between the occupational skills of men and
women can be studied. Original ASVAB test scores and O*net occupational task
requirements are converted into percentile ranks within each year using the NLSY cross-
sectional weights. Since the NLSY is a representative sample of the US population and
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Table 2.2: Gender Gap in Occupational Skill
Skill Requirements
Time Math Verbal Science Technical
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-College
1985 2.63 7.25 -4.51 -14.91
1990 0.34 4.55 -5.47 -15.94
1995 -0.67 3.17 -6.19 -17.02
2000 -2.32 1.63 -7.34 -18.20
2005 -3.04 0.70 -7.87 -19.47
College
1990 -0.50 2.22 -0.70 -4.19
1995 -2.60 0.86 -2.59 -5.41
2000 -4.10 -0.57 -4.11 -6.80
2005 -4.99 -0.34 -3.83 -6.57
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reporting 5-year averages. For detailed see text.
workforce each survey year this percentile ranking will be consistent.6 Two measures of
ASVAB ranks are reported. Following Cawley et al. (1998) we standardize test scores
using two methods: (1) by age alone (labeled “ASVAB”); and (2) by gender and age
(labeled “Pre-ASVAB”). The age adjustment is done as all individuals took the test
in 1980 and are, therefore, of diﬀerent age. The gender adjustment is done under the
assumption that ex-ante men and women are born with the potential to develop the
same skill distribution. However, due to economic incentives/preferences/stereotypes
men and women choose to specialize in diﬀerent skills starting at a young age (see
Bordalo et al., 2014, and references therein). Specifically, at first glance, women seem
to work in higher verbal task occupations and also score higher in verbal tests compared
to both men and relative to other skill types.
To broadly summarize the occupation-skill gaps between men and women, Table 2.2
reports the percentile diﬀerences across four skill categories by education and gender.
This summary converts skills to a percentile rank for each year and then averages
over five year intervals by gender. A negative value indicates that women work in
occupations requiring less of a given skill then men. Despite convergence along a
number of important dimensions (e.g., wages), it appears that the NLSY cohort gender
diﬀerences actually grew across all skill categories except verbal. These results point
6Alternatively, we can also rank individuals according to their test score in 1980 (one-time ranking).
However, this does not change the results, as only a biased drop-out from the interview survey would
do so. Therefore, assuming the same ranking strategy for individual skills and occupations is our
preferred benchmark.
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to strong occupation preferences across gender, as the table summarizes occupational
skill requirements rather than ex ante ability. This last point is especially important
given ex ante ability is shown to be virtually identical between gender (Goldin et al.,
2006). Thus, women with a college degree work in occupations with similar verbal
requirements as men, but lower math, science and technical skills. This pattern is
repeated for uneducated women, but more skewed toward technical skills.
2.3 Model of Occupational Choice
Beginning with an occupational choice model based on Roy (1951), we model both
individuals’ skills and their occupational choices. Individuals have n skill types k,
k = 1; ; n, which are drawn from a given distribution at the beginning of their working
life. We are agnostic concerning how these skill distributions are initially set, but they
may arise from educational choices earlier in life.7 We account for the potential edu-
cational investment in the empirical section. Individuals can choose from a continuum
of occupations in period 0 that diﬀer by their skill requirements, k for all k = 1; ; n,
where k > 0. That is, all occupations require some skill level of skill type k.
Individuals receive shocks during their lifetime that will force them to temporarily
leave the workforce. This is modeled by a simple two-stage Markov process (below)
which diﬀers by gender. Individuals are aware of these labor force transition probabili-
ties. The transition probability subscripts denote sequential period status. Specifically,
ee is the conditional probability of being employed today and tomorrow and eh is the
conditional probability of being employed today and staying home tomorrow, where
ee + eh = 1. As women are more likely to dropout of the labor force (i.e., childbirth)
and less likely to return (i.e., child rearing), we set mee > fee and mhe > 
f
he to cover
these respective observations. Additionally, fe < me and 
f
h > 
m
e match the observed
gender-specific employment and, by definition, home probabilities.
g =
"
ee
g
e 1  eege
1  hhgh hhgh
#
for g = f;m
When out of the labor force, skills depreciate by k;h < 0. However, when returning
to the labor force some skills are recovered k;he > 0, but jk;hej  jk;hj. The atrophy
and repair rates are skill-type specific. For most of the theoretical analysis we set
learning-by-doing to zero, k;e = 0. However, the empirical analysis does account for
returns to experience. Assume that (1+j) = (1+j;he)(1+j;h) < (1+i;he)(1+i;h) =
(1 + i) for j > i. That is, skills are sorted according to their absolute atrophy/repair,
k  0, where a higher skill has relatively higher destruction of skill. The heterogeneity
7There are many other possible inputs forming these skill distributions.
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of skill depreciation suggests that some skills are more insulated against technological
innovations.
2.3.1 Agents’ Problem
For simplicity, assume a three period model. Individuals work in period 0 for certain
and, if they do not drop out of the labor market in period 1, they also work for certain
in period 2. Transition probabilities govern if individuals who drops out of work in the
middle of their lives will return to work. Individuals draw utility from consumption,
U(c) = E
(
2X
t=0
t log(ct)
)
: (2.1)
There is no savings mechanism and individuals simply consume their income each
period, log(ct) = log(W it ) = !it. Individuals that do not work derive utility b = log(ct),
the value of their home production.8
Rather then employ shocks to working or not working, we could have drawn b from
a distribution each period, with women having a higher mean then men. However, this
will not aﬀect the qualitative results. Therefore, we keep a fixed (gender equal) utility
from staying home and allow for diﬀering transition probabilities.
2.3.2 Wages
Assume all possible skill type occupations exist, i.e., there is a continuum of occu-
pations using diﬀerent skill mixes. The wage an individual receives in the labor market
is,
!it =
nX
k=1

k
i
k + k
 
ik;t  ik

ik

: (2.2)
Wages are a function of the returns to each skill type k, such that the higher the
skill content an occupation requires the higher the wage as long as k > 0. Agents
are potentially penalized if they choose an occupation that requires more skill then
they have, k  0. The interaction between occupation requirement ik and skill
mismatch
 
ik;t  ik

suggests the penalty (or reward) of mismatch is larger the greater
the skill content. This second term will ensure that not all individuals try to match
with the highest possible skill content given increasing returns. The second term can
also be written as, kik;tik   k (ik)2, where the first part is the complementarity
between individual skills and occupation requirements, and the second term is the
8Alternatively, assume the economy has complete markets so income maximization yields the same
results as utility maximization.
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general decreasing returns to skill type k. Note that wages without gaps are,
!it =
nX
k=1

k
i
k + k
 
(1 + k;e)
i
k;t 1  ik

ik

; (2.3)
where k;e is the return to experience for skill type k. Wages right after a gap period
at t  1 are,
!it =
nX
k=1

k
i
k + k
 
(1 + k)
i
k;t 2  ik

ik

: (2.4)
2.3.3 Maximization Problem
The agents maximization problem is to choose the optimal fkgnk=1 by maximizing
expected utility, taking transitions into and out of the labor market into account,
max
fkgnk=1
(1 + gee(1 + ))
nX
k=1

k
i
k + k
 
ik;0  ik

ik

+
2geh
g
he
nX
k=1

k
i
k + k
 
ik;2  ik

ik

+ C(b;g; ): (2.5)
The first term is the net present value of wages if the individual does not have a home
spell, the second term is the last period wage if the individual took a gap year in period
one, and the last term summarizes the utility from all periods the individual may spend
at home.
With a home spell, k;2 = k;0(1 + k), the resulting FOCs are (omitting individual
superscripts):
(1 + 2) (k   2kk) + (1 + 2 (1 + k))kk;0 = 0;
where 1 = (1 + gee(1 + )) and 2 = 2
g
eh
g
he. Therefore, the optimal occupational
choice for skill type k is,
?k =
k
2k
+
(1 + 2(1 + k))
2 (1 + 2)
k;0: (2.6)
2.3.4 Comparative Statics
The outcomes of interest in this model are most easily seen from the comparative
statics. From Equation (2.6) higher skilled individuals choose more skill-demanding
occupations. Moreover, women will sort into lower skill requirement occupations, since
^m > ^f , where ^ = (1+2(1+k))
2(1+2)
. In the extreme case, i.e., men never drop out, me = 0,
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men have much stronger assortative matching then women. Since k < 0 and @^@k >
0. In contrast, women will be increasingly mismatched across skill types with larger
absolute depreciation rates. In summary, gap-prone individuals, when maximizing
lifetime income, will pick a lower skill occupation when the absolute depreciation rate,
k (atrophy plus repair), is larger.
More realistically, assume a finite combination of skill requirements in the economy
exist. The set of occupations requires, for example, high math and low verbal or
higher verbal and lower math skills. Women would be more likely to sort into the
occupations where the dominant skill has lower depreciation rates. For example, if
the computer revolution fostered an environment where math and science skills could
quickly become obsolete, but there was no similar eﬀect on verbal skills, women would
self-select into occupations that require relatively more verbal skills. That is, taking
into account the absolute depreciation rates of skills, if women are more likely to take
prolonged career gaps, it is optimal for women to choose occupations high in verbal
skills and low in math/science skills. Of course, women may also choose diﬀerent careers
due to simple occupational preferences, i.e., women prefer verbal-intensive occupations
over technically-intensive occupations. The model presented here only captures the
diﬀerence in monetary terms, disregarding preference diﬀerences.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Individual Mismatch
Combining the O*net skill content with the ASVAB test scores for the NLSY co-
hort provides a measure of mismatch in individual skills and occupation requirements.
Figure 2.1 graphs the average mismatch between individual skills and occupation re-
quirements by total accumulated work experience. Since we are interested in gender
diﬀerences, the figure shows the average mismatch of women relative to men in per-
centiles, where a positive number indicates women are more mismatched than men,
and the reverse holds for negative values. The computation is done in five year in-
tervals, with individuals’ relative skill ranking, similarly to the occupational rankings,
computed for each year. That is, each year we re-rank the individuals remaining in the
NLSY sample.9 The figure assumes that the distributions for males and females are
identical in 1980 (the year of the ASVAB test), e.g., the 90th percentile woman has the
same skill level as the 90th percentile man. We later relax this assumption, allowing
men and women to follow diﬀerent career paths prior to the exam date.
9The results are not sensitive to any of the above ranking assumptions (e.g., sorting individuals
according to their ranking in the base year 1979 provides very similar quantitative patterns).
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Figure 2.1: Gender Gap Mismatch of Skills by Education
Notes: Average mismatch measures are computed using NLSY 1979 sample weights for all workers
(part- and full-time). Results graph average diﬀerences between women and men. See text for details.
Positive gender gaps exist in math, science and technical fields, with gaps increas-
ing as workers accumulate years of experience. While the math gap for non-college
graduates is nearly zero, the science gap for college graduates is approximately zero.
In contrast, the opposite gender gap is observed for verbal skills, i.e., women are less
mismatched than men.
We expect that individuals will exhibit learning-by-doing and move toward bet-
ter occupation-skill matches as experience increases. The initial mismatch gap (i.e.,
workers without work experience) for men follows this theory, with men learning about
their skill set and finding more suitable jobs over time (see figure 2.2).10 This is true
for both education groups, although the process is much faster and steeper for college
graduates. In direct contrast, women seem to exhibit very little “learning with time”
(graph omitted here), explaining the evolution of the gender gap mismatch (see figure
2.1). Part of this higher persistent mismatch for women could be due to an age eﬀect.
That is, as women are more likely to take work gaps, groups with low levels of work
experience are more heterogeneous across age.
2.4.2 Monetized Mismatch
If skills are underutilized in the labor market, individuals may face lower wages
and tenure. Figure 2.1 implies that women could be particularly exposed to any nega-
tive eﬀects of skill mismatch across the non-verbal skill dimension. However, observed
skill mismatch alone does not necessarily lead to suboptimal outcomes in terms of
10Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014) show that students attempt math-heavy college majors
and learn about their abilities through failure, moving to more suitable college majors in the process.
We postulate that this same mechanism might apply to the labor market.
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Figure 2.2: Male Mismatch of Skills by Education
Notes: Average mismatch measures are computed using NLSY 1979 sample weights for all workers
(part- and full-time). Results graph average mismatch for men only. See text for details.
maximizing wage returns. One approach is to compare individuals’ current match to
the optimal skill-matched occupation, and assess the wage diﬀerence. To understand
which skills are most sensitive to mismatching with respect to wages, Figures 2.4 and
2.5 graph the average “monetized” mismatch. This monetized mismatch concept is par-
tial equilibrium in nature and computes the cost of skill mismatch for women and men
assuming no depreciation of skill over time and identical work experience for all indi-
viduals. That is, this type of mismatch computation abstracts from individual-specific
optimal choices related to skill depreciation rates, work experience accumulation, and
any general equilibrium eﬀects aﬀecting skill returns.
Given the economic theory above, combined with data on the occupation skill
requirements, individuals’ skill rank, hourly wages, and other individual characteristics,
we can compute skill prices by running the following regression by year, based on
Equation (2.3),
log(wi;t) =
X
k
k;t
i
k;t +
X
k
k;t(
i
k  ik;t)ik;t +
X
k
ke;t
 
ik  expit

ik;t +X
k
ke2;t

ik 
 
expit
2
ik;t +X
0
itt + i;t; (2.7)
where Xit includes age, age squared, race, work experience, work experience squared,
marital status, region and degree dummies. ik;t is the skill requirement of each oc-
cupation from O*net data, ik is the skill of each individual from ASVAB test scores
(we use the percentile rank measure as before) and exp is work experience measured
in weeks. Initial skill from the ASVAB test scores interacted with years of experience
give current skill levels, it;k = ik  expit. This specification means that  provides
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the monetized occupational return to math, verbal and science in the economy, and
 provides any wage premium for overqualified individuals or wage penalty for under-
qualified individuals if  > 0. Regressions are run for all years from 1985 to 2010
separately for individuals with and without a college degree. We do this only using
full-time working males. Women might be negatively or positively selected into cer-
tain occupations, especially if our hypothesis of larger women’s mismatch and absolute
depreciation diﬀerences by skill type is true, potentially biasing any skill prices. In
addition, we only include men who have not had substantial working gaps throughout
their entire working-lives. We define individuals without substantial working gaps as
individuals that have been employed at least 75 percent of their potential working-life
(this includes every week since the time of graduation from their highest schooling
choice). This sample restriction drops about 18 to 25 percent of the male sample, with
18 percent being dropped in 2006 and 25 percent dropped in 1985. Not surprisingly,
when conditioning on educational attainment, this restriction only reduces the college
sample by six percent through the whole time period. For further details see Section 2.2
above. We also experiment with more strict definitions, e.g. 80 percent, with results
robust to further restrictions. This sample selection ensures the results do not capture
the impact of a gap (or the absolute depreciation rate).
Given Equation (2.7), the monetized mismatch is then,
mikt =
X
k
^k;t
 
?k;t  ik;t
 X
k
^k;t
n 
?k;t
2    ik;t2o+X
k
 
^k;t + ^ke;tdexpt + ^ke2;tdexp2t  ik  ?k;t  ik;t ; (2.8)
where ?i;t is the occupation that would maximize an individual’s wage in each year
irrespective of any equilibrium eﬀects. This specification accounts for a finite number
of occupations, with given math/technical/science/verbal combinations, rather than a
continuum of possibilities as presented in the theoretical model. Potential experience in
weeks is denoted with dexp, which is approximated by the average weeks of experience
from the wage regression sample of full-time males without major employment gap
history. The monetized mismatch presented here simply assumes a world without
depreciation, where men and women have the same work histories in terms of hours.
Figure 2.3 shows the average wage component attributable to each skill type for
the above wage sample. For college men the skills contribute steady shares to wages,
with math and verbal having the largest contribution. Science plays no role in wages,
and points to lower average wages for men working in high science occupations. For
non-college men, the wage contribution of science has seen the largest upward trend,
although technical returns were historically most relevant. Math has always yielded
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Figure 2.3: Wage Skill Component
Notes: Skill returns are computed from yearly regressions of hourly log wages of full-time/attached
male workers on percentile O*net skill measures, percentile O*net skill measures versus ASVAB
test score mismatch, interactions of O*net skill measures with ASVAB test scores and experi-
ence/experience squared, experience, experience squared, age, age squared, dummies for race (Black,
Asian, and White), region, marital status (married, never married, and other), and last school degree
(high school drop out, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post-college graduate).
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Figure 2.4: The Gender Gap of Monetized Mismatch (Pre-AVSAB)
Notes: Average mismatch measures are computed using NLSY 1979 sample weights for all workers
(part- and full-time). Results graph average diﬀerences between women and men. See Equation (2.8)
and text for details.
positive returns.
Figure 2.4 shows the monetized mismatch from Equation (2.8) for women versus
men (i.e., the gender gap) by education level. As before, the figure shows the aver-
age mismatch of women relative to men (now) in “monetized” percentiles. A positive
number indicates a mismatch of women relative to men that contributes to a positive
gender wage gap, with the reverse holding true for negative values.
Non-college women saw the largest monetized mismatch in technical skills during
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the past century. That is, would women have better matched their technical abilities
to occupational requirements, ceteris paribus, the wage gap of the average unedu-
cated woman would have been roughly three percentage points smaller, although this
monetized mismatch disappeared by 2000. Therefore, a decrease in occupations em-
phasizing technical skills could have potentially contributed to the narrowing gender
gap for uneducated women (see also the literature on employment polarization and the
disappearing routine occupations, e.g., Autor and Dorn, 2013). For college-educated
women, the largest contributor to the gender gap, in terms of skill mismatch, has al-
ways been math. Had women been better matched to occupations in terms of their
math abilities, the gender wage gap between the average college-educated male and
female should have been roughly one to three percentage points smaller. While the
monetized math mismatch has been steadily increasing over the sample, the financial
crisis corresponds with a temporary dip in the monetized mismatch of math skills.
To explore the idea that women and men may have pursued diﬀerent skill-specific
education, potentially constraining their occupational choices later in life, we specify
a regression using standardized test scores adjusted by age only. The age adjustment
is necessary as all individuals took the ASVAB test in 1980 and were, therefore, dif-
ferent ages. Not adjusting for gender then allows for the fact that, even by age 16,
men and women may already have chosen to emphasize diﬀerent school subjects lead-
ing to diﬀerent skill outcomes. The reproduced monetized mismatch results (based on
Equation (2.8)), using this skill measure, are depicted in Figure 2.5. The skill wage
components are virtually the same as the original specification, since this experiment
mostly aﬀects the relative position of women to men, and skill prices are only com-
puted using full-time male workers. The qualitative patterns do not change with this
post-education skill measure, but the relative gender gap is slightly smaller for college
women. This may suggest that women make schooling choices with future career paths
(occupations) in mind. However, the diﬀerences are not large enough to make any
statistical inference.11
2.4.3 Atrophy and Repair
The above results beg the question: Why are women mismatched, especially in
math skills for college graduates and technical skills for non-college graduates? We
investigate if the underlying mechanism points to diﬀerences in atrophy and repair
rates. To estimate absolute depreciation rates we estimate a wage regression based on
Equations (2.3) and (2.4), which is akin to extending the above regression Equation
(2.7) to allow for individuals with gaps and the cost of taking a gap. The regression to
11It is important to note that these results do not capture any diﬀerences in college education
choices. Only those schooling choices made before taking the ASVAB test are captured.
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Figure 2.5: The Gender Gap of Monetized Mismatch (AVSAB)
Notes: Average mismatch measures are computed using NLSY 1979 sample weights for all workers
(part- and full-time). Results graph average diﬀerences between women and men. See Equation (2.8)
and text for details.
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where, in addition to the previous wage Equation (2.7), gap measures the number
of weeks out of the labor force. As in Robst and VanGilder (2000), we use both a
cumulative and short-run measure for a gap. The cumulative measure is computed
by summing all gaps from the year of graduation, while the current measure only
accounts for gaps within the 52 weeks prior to the interview date. Since quadratics
on gaps are not statistically significant, the below results do not include the quadratic
results. The regressions use the same controls as the computation of skill prices above,
e.g., experience, experience squared, age, age squared, dummies for race (Black, Asian,
and White), region, marital status (married, never married, and other), and last school
degree (high school drop out, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and
post-college graduate), plus year and a part-time dummies if part-time workers are
included. An interaction between marital status and gender, since women and men
tend to have diﬀerent “marriage premia,” is also included. In line with the literature,
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from a pooled regression are provided. This
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Table 2.3: Full-Time Worker’s Depreciation Rates
VARIABLES LTC C+ LTC C+ LTC C+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math -0.054 0.451*** -0.070 0.394*** -0.035 0.475***
(0.053) (0.126) (0.053) (0.123) (0.054) (0.126)
Verbal -0.004 0.751*** 0.002 0.760*** -0.027 0.707***
(0.047) (0.108) (0.047) (0.105) (0.048) (0.108)
Science -0.365*** -0.992*** -0.359*** -0.937*** -0.367*** -1.006***
(0.058) (0.175) (0.059) (0.170) (0.059) (0.177)
Technical 0.607*** 0.351*** 0.614*** 0.383*** 0.595*** 0.373***
(0.041) (0.127) (0.041) (0.126) (0.042) (0.130)
Cumm Gap 0.304*** 0.481*** 0.317*** 0.489***
(0.034) (0.070) (0.034) (0.070)
Last Gap -0.723*** -1.080*** -0.721*** -1.069***
(0.079) (0.264) (0.079) (0.264)
Cumm Gap M -0.075*** -0.095*** -0.072*** -0.087***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023)
Last Gap M -0.951* -2.706** -0.796 -2.442**
(0.490) (1.186) (0.493) (1.165)
Cumm Gap V 0.059*** 0.047** 0.056*** 0.041*
(0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.022)
Last Gap V 0.359 1.958** 0.270 1.873*
(0.428) (0.975) (0.426) (0.974)
Cumm Gap S 0.043*** 0.086*** 0.041*** 0.082***
(0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029)
Last Gap S 0.602 0.917 0.478 0.734
(0.485) (1.284) (0.485) (1.262)
Cumm Gap T -0.003 -0.009 -0.000 -0.009
(0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.022)
Last Gap T 0.459 -0.370 0.463 -0.408
(0.342) (1.176) (0.344) (1.183)
Observations 40,411 14,345 40,411 14,345 40,411 14,345
R-squared 0.302 0.319 0.302 0.320 0.305 0.324
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
All regressions include experience, experience squared, age, age squared, dummies for years,
race (Black, Asian, and White), region, gender, marital status (married, never married, and
other), interaction terms between gender and marital status, and last school degree (high school
drop out, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post-college graduate).
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follows given the number of observations and the limited number of gaps observed in
the data.12
Since the results are estimated using panel data and individuals are follwed over
time, there is a potential for serially correlated error terms biasing estimates. Conse-
quently, we also discuss result from generalized least squares (GLS) regressions assum-
ing the error is composed of an unobserved individual eﬀect and a random component,
i;t = i + i;t.
Table 2.3 includes only full-time workers (results including part-time workers and
GLS estimations can be found in Appendix B.3). The general patterns described below
are robust to the inclusion of part-time workers or accounting for serially correlated
error terms with GLS. The reported variables use the post-ASVAB test scores (i.e.,
allow for men and women to pre-sort into diﬀerent study paths). Results with pre-test
measures are similar, but usually marginally smaller in magnitude. In addition to gap
rates, which are gaps in weeks multiplied by individual skill ranking and occupational
skill ranking, the tables also report the return to occupation-specific skills, ^.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.3 show results when only including the cumulative
gap measure, columns (3) and (4) shows results for only recent gaps, and columns (5)
and (6) show the joint estimates for non-college and college graduates respectively. As
in prior research (e.g., England, 1982; Robst and VanGilder, 2000), the cumulative gap
measure shows no negative impact on wages; if anything the return to cumulative gaps
is positive. However, the cumulative gap measure interacted with math skills reveals
some small eﬀects. For example, a college graduate ranked in the 100th math skill
percentile and working in the 100th percentile math occupation faces a wage loss of
0.38 percentage points after taking a one month (4 week) gap. In contrast, an individual
in the 50 percentile rank in terms of skills and occupation faces a wage penalty of 0.10
percentage points only. The loss for an identical non-college worker would be 0.08
percentage points.
The regression R-squared, at about one-third, is somewhat larger than standard
estimates in this literature (see for example Robst and VanGilder, 2000). Given the
additional detailed information on skill requirements by occupations and individual
skill measures, this is to be expected. Returns to math, verbal and technical skills
are, in line with Figure 2.3, positive and statistically significant for college graduates.
Only the returns to science have negative coeﬃcients. For non-college graduates only
returns to technical skills are large and positive, further corroborating the findings in
Section 2.4.2.
As in Robst and VanGilder (2000), a recent gap has a larger wage impact. For
example, the college graduate ranked in the 50th math percentile and working in the
12Time trends do show similar results, but exhibit somewhat larger standard errors.
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Table 2.4: Gender-Specific Depreciation Rates
Male Female
VARIABLES LTC C+ LTC C+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math 0.029 0.884*** -0.004 0.140
(0.079) (0.171) (0.072) (0.173)
Verbal -0.310*** 0.596*** 0.270*** 0.862***
(0.073) (0.149) (0.064) (0.165)
Science -0.202** -1.779*** -0.501*** -0.519**
(0.085) (0.257) (0.081) (0.231)
Technical 0.534*** 0.787*** 0.479*** 0.210
(0.056) (0.187) (0.076) (0.197)
Cumm Gap 0.272*** 0.396*** 0.416*** 0.577***
(0.047) (0.097) (0.049) (0.097)
Last Gap -0.765*** -1.036*** -0.759*** -1.293***
(0.109) (0.371) (0.123) (0.404)
Cumm Gap M -0.061** -0.093*** -0.081*** -0.056*
(0.024) (0.031) (0.019) (0.033)
Last Gap M -1.185* -1.648 0.080 -2.841*
(0.656) (1.744) (0.700) (1.595)
Cumm Gap V 0.096*** 0.076*** -0.003 0.005
(0.021) (0.029) (0.017) (0.033)
Last Gap V 0.315 0.589 -0.243 3.050**
(0.607) (1.516) (0.613) (1.353)
Cumm Gap S -0.020 0.115*** 0.096*** 0.081**
(0.021) (0.044) (0.019) (0.037)
Last Gap S 0.788 0.537 0.034 0.892
(0.611) (2.158) (0.795) (1.480)
Cumm Gap T 0.017 -0.074** 0.006 -0.022
(0.016) (0.030) (0.022) (0.040)
Last Gap T 0.456 0.093 0.998 -1.460
(0.435) (1.785) (0.885) (1.692)
Observations 22,663 7,876 17,748 6,469
R-squared 0.255 0.319 0.309 0.281
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted
by their respective first letter.
See Table 2.3 for further details.
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50th percentile math occupation faces a wage penalty of 2.71 percentage points when
taking a one month gap from the labor force, with the top ranked individual facing a gap
four times as large. In general, a college graduate already faces a 4.32 percentage point
general penalty for the one month employment gap. While the quantitative results
decrease from column (4) to (6), the diﬀerence is small. Unlike college-graduates, we
do not see a similar math skill-specific penalty gap for non-college graduates. We
conjecture that the tasks preformed by a non-college worker with regards to numerical
skills have been robust towards technological innovation, while the numerical skills of
college graduates have had to adapt to the recent (ICT) technology innovation.
The positive coeﬃcients on verbal skills interacted with gap measures provide a
possible explanation for women choosing occupations with considerable verbal skills, if
these occupations are immune to skill destruction. However, since selection might be
an issue, we also run regressions conditional on gender and education. Table 2.4 shows
the gender-specific results (GLS results can be found in Appendix B.3). Columns (1)
and (3) report the eﬀects for non-college men and women, and columns (2) and (4)
list the eﬀects for male and female college graduates, respectively. Large diﬀerences
can be easily seen when comparing skill returns across gender within education groups.
Given women are more positively matched on verbal skills, the returns to high-verbal
occupations are large and positive, while the returns to math are insignificant.
For college-graduates the depreciation rates are very similar to Table 2.3. The verbal
gap measure (significant at five percent) completely oﬀsets the math gap measure. One
possible interpretation is that women can self-insure against the adverse eﬀects of taking
a working gap by picking occupations relatively low in math requirements, but high
in verbal requirements. Therefore, these results could explain the observed mismatch
patterns from Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 of college graduates.
For non-college women the results show no skill-specific depreciation rates, but
instead reveal only general wage loss with gap periods. The skill-specific depreciation
rates do not seem to be the main contributor of skill mismatch. An explanation based
on stereotypes or preferences could potentially be more relevant (Bordalo et al., 2014).
2.5 Conclusion
We propose and evaluate the idea that women make occupational choices based
on skill-specific atrophy and repair with respect to employment expectations. This
is a coherent and consistent theory supporting diﬀerences between male and female
occupational choices. That is, women may choose an occupation with a perceived wage
penalty if the penalty for time-oﬀ is small. The model presented generates significant
economic incentives for women to: (1) strongly prefer occupations that exhibit lower
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skill-specific depreciation; and (2) pursue the accumulation of skills that are robust
to work gaps. The examples provided indicate that the combination of skills within
an occupation is more important than the occupation itself. That is, if the largest
skill component within an occupation is robust to career gaps, then the other skill
requirements’ atrophy can be oﬀset.
Using the NLSY panel dataset and O*net occupational skills information, we as-
sess the importance of skill-specific atrophy-repair rates on wages when faced with
employment breaks. The model presented leads directly to the empirical exercise and
the regression equations employed. The results strongly support the idea that college
educated females avoid math-heavy occupations, and pursue verbal-heavy occupations
instead. This is due to the high skill atrophy associated with math skills, and the
ability of verbal skills to act as “skill insurance” against gaps. Additionally, for college
educated individuals, math is the skill most vulnerable to loss during employment gaps,
which also implies a slow rebuilding post-break. In contrast, non-college educated in-
dividuals experience a much smaller math skill loss. In general, the math content of
an occupation appears to be a significant negative for individuals who experience or
expect employment gaps, but this is especially true for college educated individuals.
While we find large atrophy-repair rates, the current exercise is unable to estimate
how important these rates are for female occupational choices. Moreover, the analysis
presented above ignores the general equilibrium eﬀects. That is, if women switch to
other occupations, it would change specific skill wage rates. Thus, a general equilib-
rium model is required to further pursue specific questions, such as: How does skill
mismatch contribute to the persistent wage gap? Lastly, we have ignored any edu-
cational diﬀerences post-ASVAB testing, meaning that education decisions taken in
college are not included. In ongoing research we study the educational diﬀerences be-
tween men and women in college. We take these microeconomic estimates of atrophy
and repair by skill type and develop a model to account for equilibrium wages and
college education choices. We then ask: How much of the observed gender education
diﬀerences and the overall gender (wage) gap can be explained by women, accounting
for both wage expectations and skill-specific atrophy-repair functions when making
educational/occupational choices.
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3 Math Matters: Education Choices and
Wage Inequality
Joint with Michelle Rendall
3.1 Introduction
Math is a language of logic. It is a disciplined, organized way of thinking.
There is a right answer; there are rules that must be followed. More than
any other subject, math is rigor distilled. Mastering the language of logic
helps to embed higher-order habits in kids’ minds: the ability to reason,
for example, to detect patterns and to make informed guesses. Those kinds
of skills [have] rising value in a world in which information [is] cheap and
messy.1
The US has seen a large rise in wage inequality since the mid-1970s (see Figure
3.1). While standard skill-biased technical change (SBTC) can match the average wage
trend as measured by the college wage premium (i.e., college/non-college), the large
and increasing within-group wage inequality is ignored. In contrast, labor augmenting
technical change biased toward math skills can account for a large part of the observed
within-group inequality. This paper documents the increasing importance of math
skills in the labor market.
Determining which individuals are driving wage inequality and what makes them
special yields three facts that support math as a driver of wage inequality:
1. Highly quantitative occupations have exhibited increasing relative wages since
the mid-1970s.
2. The numerical skill content of occupations and the math content of college majors
are highly correlated.
3. Students attempt to study majors with the highest math content, but are con-
strained by their initial abilities.2
1Amanda Ripley, The Smartest Kids in the World: And How They Got That Way
2Note, we use the terms “initial-” and “ex ante” ability interchangeably. Initial or ex ante ability
refers to the ability an individual has upon completing high school.
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Source: IPUMS-CPS (see King et al., 2010). Log wages are residual wages from a regression of hourly
log wages of full-time (at least 35 hours of work and 40 weeks per year) male workers aged 25 to 59
on age, age squared, dummies for education, race, state, and marital status.
Figure 3.1: US Wage Inequality
Two distinct trends emerge when measuring the importance of general ability and
math skills.3 The increasing importance of math skills for college educated individuals
is shown in panel (a) of Figure 3.2, where increasing wage returns to math skills are
set against the stagnant returns of general ability. In contrast, the non-college group
has experienced the opposite, with decreasing wage returns to math skills set against
increasing returns to general ability. This evidence, combined with the three facts
above, suggests that the US economy has not only experienced SBTC, but also math-
biased technical change (MBTC), where MBTC cannot be exploited through college
attendance alone. More precisely, students who study math-related topics in college will
enjoy the largest wage benefits. Thus, the trends presented in Figure 3.2 emphasize
MBTC as a mechanism underpinning income inequality between college graduates.
MBTC is unlikely to be the main driver of income inequality within the bottom half
of the US wage distribution.
The facts and trends discussed above complement the research by Kambourov and
3General- and math ability are measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). General ability is a combination of math-
and verbal abilities for the 1979 cohort (see, Altonji et al., 2012a, for details on the construction of
standardized AFQT scores).
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Source: NLSY79. Males aged 14-22 in 1979. Wage returns are computed from yearly regressions
of hourly log wages of full-time workers (at least 35 hours in main job) on standardized AFQT test
score, standardized AFQT math scores, age, age squared, dummies for race, region, marital status,
and whether the individuals lives in a MSA or not.
Figure 3.2: Wage Returns
Manovskii (2009a), who explain a large part of within-group wage inequality by focus-
ing on occupational mobility and the cost of switching occupations. They find that
occupational mobility accounts for a significant portion of wage inequality. Similarly,
Huggett et al. (2011) study lifetime inequality by decomposing the contribution be-
tween initial human capital endowment and “luck,” finding that 61.5 percent of the
variation in lifetime earnings are due to initial endowments. However, the authors are
silent on the decisions (forces) that lead to the diﬀerences in human capital at age
23. Thus, we expand on this body of research by modeling the initial conditions that
proceed labor force choices. Our approach diﬀers from Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009a) and Huggett et al. (2011) by explaining what shapes the individual hetero-
geneity at the time of occupational choice (i.e., they do not model the formal college
human capital accumulation process). We believe the formation of initial conditions
(by age 23 when entering the labor market) to be important, as education choices mat-
ter for occupation decisions later in life. We show that intra-education group variance
is missed when separating the population strictly by educational attainment (college,
non-college) alone.
Intra-education group income inequality motivate Altonji et al. (2012b), who find
that male electrical engineers earn 51.6 percent more than male education majors,
which is comparable to the college wage premium of 57.7 percent. However, due to the
empirical focus of their research, they only estimate disaggregated cross-sectional re-
turns to college majors with associated math and verbal SAT scores. The authors note
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that this area of research is relatively unexplored, but is important for understanding
the structural mechanisms underpinning the ex post outcomes of higher education. A
comprehensive review of the existing empirical studies on the returns to college major
can be found in Table 2 of Altonji et al. (2012b). Specifically, the authors note that
there is lack of research explaining why individuals choose diﬀerent education types,
and how this translates into occupational choices. A crucial diﬀerence between our
research and Altonji et al. (2012b) is, by using the information on mathematic skill
requirements within occupations from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles4 (DOT),
we show that mathematics-focused majors are highly correlated with ex post wage
outcomes through the occupational choices available to these majors. We hypothesize
that wage inequality is driven, to a large extent, by individuals’ initial abilities, which
limit education options and, consequently, occupational choices.
Addressing similar wage discrepancies as Altonji et al. (2012b), Silos and Smith
(2012) look at the trade-oﬀ between acquiring specific and targeted human capital.
They concentrate on individuals’ choices between education paths leading to specific
occupations versus education paths that have broader applicability, and thus more
occupational choice. The authors show that policies directed at occupation-specific
human capital accumulation lead to lower income growth and lower inequality. MBTC
sits within the broader educational transition described above. We emphasize the
importance of the skill types accumulated, with particular attention given to math-
ematics as either a specific necessary ability or as a strong indicator of associated
abilities. Those who major in math-intensive areas may initially sort into high-wage
occupations, with little incentive of switching (to alternative) occupations.
Carneiro et al. (2011) and Eisenhauer et al. (2013) explore another dimension of
intra-education group income inequality and find that the returns to college enrollment
are approximately zero for low ability individuals, and possibly negative. MBTC is a
potential mechanism that explains this observation, as math-light college majors, with-
out exception, occupy the bottom of the college group wage distribution. Furthermore,
there is a significant mass of college graduates with zero and three college math credits.
The idea of SBTC found in Acemoglu (2002), which builds upon the empirical
work of Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and Autor et al. (1998), formalizes a model in
which the labor augmenting technical change is divided along the education dimension
(college/non-college). This model has become a workhorse for analyzing and explaining
the persistent increase in the relative wages of college graduates. Our work builds on
this existing framework by focusing on the distributional wage changes between college
graduates. We add a separate mechanism that approximates the specific skills driving
wage inequality intra-college graduates.
4Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 1977 and 1991
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The college attendance mechanism in this paper is loosely based on Hendricks and
Schoellman (2014). In that paper the authors look at the discrete education choices of
individuals (i.e., high school, some college, and college), focusing on ex ante abilities as
measured by IQ scores. Their results show that one-third of the college wage premium
and one-fourth of its growth is driven by ability (“ability premium”). While looking at
ability as a driver of wage outcomes, Hendricks and Schoellman (2014) define broad
education categories that mask the sub-group mainly driving wage inequality: the top
earning college graduates, who exhibit strong mathematical abilities.
This paper is unique in linking ability, acquired math skills, occupations and ris-
ing wage inequality. We aim to explain the evolution of the college graduate wage
distribution using a model that emphasizes MBTC combined with the three facts pre-
viously discussed. The model revolves around the education choice. Individuals make
a choice to attempt college or directly enter the labor market. As we are interested
in the outcome of the college education process, we directly assign individuals math
credits subject to ability constraints, with some individuals dropping out of college.
Math credits characterize each college major in our model. Individuals supply both
their ex post ability and any acquired math skills to the labor market. Only college
graduates can supply the math skills associated with college majors. Firms hire college
and non-college labor. Wage inequality is driven by both generic SBTC and specific
MBTC.
The theory of MBTC put forth in this paper is complimentary to the task-biased
technical change (TBTC) literature first developed by Autor et al. (2003). In order to
study a rise in wage inequality in the US, the authors decompose occupation require-
ments into three task types: manual (hand and finger dexterity), routine (repetitive)
and abstract (analytical). Generally, the low, middle and high portions of the income
distribution are linked to manual, routine and abstract tasks, respectively. Therefore, a
rise in abstract tasks and a fall in routine tasks can generate the wage polarization ob-
served in the US. The abstract measure used in the TBTC literature is composed of two
parts, with one capturing the managerial/interpersonal tasks and the other measuring
the mathematical skills. MBTC focuses on the second measure, as math skills can be
measured at an individual level and cleanly linked to educational choices. Since math
skills can be acquired, the supply of these skills can most likely be influenced through
education systems and individual choices. In contrast, beyond the significant measure-
ment issues, linking interpersonal skills to acquired knowledge is diﬃcult. Moreover,
unlike the TBTC literature, we focus on explaining intra-education group inequality
linked to education choices, rather than overall wage polarization in the US. A pro-
nounced wage gap between low- (e.g., communication, psychology, music and drama)
and high-math credit majors (e.g., mathematics, engineering, economics, finance) is
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documented in Table 1 of Altonji et al. (2012b). Given this heterogeneity, low- and
high-wage college majors cannot be split along a routine/abstract task dimension.
The focus of this paper is to assess the contribution of MBTC, coupled with innate
ability constraints, to the increasing wage inequality in the US from 1980 to 2010.
We first calibrate the model to 1980 and then increase skill-biased and math-biased
productivity growth rates to match the rise in college attainment and the college wage
premium. Given the same innate distribution of skill in 1980 and 2010, we can measure
the contribution of MBTC and innate constraints to the rise in wage inequality over
time. The calibrated model does will in generating the main trends over time, such as
college attendance, college students’ abilities and drop out rates. The counterfactuals
highlight the strength of MBTC as a determinant of intra-college graduate income
inequality. With SBTC alone, the college wage premium is matched through all college
graduate wages growing over time, which ignores the observed intra-group trends. In
contrast, a combination of SBTC and MBTC matches both the aggregate and intra-
group trends observed in the data: the stagnation of wages at the bottom of the college
graduate group and the substantial increase in wages for the top college graduates.
While high ability individuals respond by studying more math, the bottom of the
college graduates are unable to respond because of their limited skill set. Nonetheless,
given the rising college premium, more individuals attend college, decreasing average
ability (and increasing the variance) of college students. This phenomena feeds back
into an even larger math gap between the top and bottom students, increasing wage
inequality even further. That is, MBTC is a type of SBTC to which some people
cannot respond because of their ability constraint. Given empirical evidence, we argue
that math is a valid proxy/measure for these skills.
Wage inequality across diﬀerent education groups, mathematic requirements of col-
lege majors and quantitative occupation requirements form the basis of our model.
Thus, Section 3.2 provides a summary of the data facts related to wage inequality,
occupations and college majors over time and across cohorts. The general equilibrium
model is outlined in Section 3.3, Section 3.4 explains the calibration procedure, and
Section 3.5 provides analytical results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
This research relies on three facts listed in the introduction and expanded upon in
this section. Together, these three points present a coherent story of ex ante mathemat-
ical ability dictating college major options, from which occupations and, ultimately,
wages are determined. Those with higher mathematics abilities pursue math-heavy
majors and occupations. These particular occupations also enjoy the highest wages.
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Furthermore, the math intensive majors that lead to higher wage occupations are in-
creasingly shunned by each subsequent generation of college degree holders. This shift
away from math-heavy majors further exacerbates wage inequality.
3.2.1 Who is Driving Wage Inequality?
To illustrate which education-group subsets are driving wage inequality, we use
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), from which the residual of a Mincer
wage regression is derived from log hourly wages of full-time, full-year males aged 25-
59. The regression controls for age, age-squared, race, marital status, and state of
residence (using CPS weights). The unexplained residual for various education-wage
groups are compared in Figure 3.3. We use the notationally abbreviations for wage
percentiles: “C” for college, “NC” for non-college, and the “A” for the total population
(all).
(a) Bottom (b) Top
Source: CPS. See Figure 3.1 for the computation of log hourly wages.
Figure 3.3: Wage Performance
The cross-education wage-group comparisons highlight the importance of high-
earning college graduates in driving wage inequality, especially since the mid-1980s.
Figure 3.3a compares the residual wages of the C10 and C20 with the NC80 and
NC90 wage groups, normalized against the A50 (50th percentile in the total sample).
The bottom earning college graduates have significantly lower wages than the upper
non-college wage groups and the average wage. All comparisons show a flat or mild
divergence. The final comparison within Figure 3.3a shows the bottom college-wage
decile has lost ground against the average individual. To put the average into perspec-
tive, college-graduates account for about 30 percent of the sample. That is, the average
individual (A50) is a non-college graduate, just above the average non-college (NC50)
individual (see Figure 3.3b bottom line).
58 Math Matters
In contrast to Figure 3.3a, Figure 3.3b compares the residual wages of the middle
and top college, and the middle non-college wage groups with the average individual.
The C90 wage group has outpaced the C50 wage group by 20 percent since the mid-
1970s. This is a remarkable performance considering the C50 wage group increased
their wage premium against the median individual by approximately 12 percent. For
reference, the college wage premium grew by 22 percent. The implications of this figure
are summarized in two points: (1) the average college graduate is outpacing all other
groups, but (2) the top college graduates are sprinting ahead of everyone. Thus, a
large part of wage inequality growth is driven by the top college-wage groups, while
the bottom college-graduates are left behind compared to a large share of non-college
graduates.
3.2.2 Fact 1: MBTC
As within-group wage inequality is driven by the top earners, it is important to
pin down the characteristics that defines this group. The idea of MBTC is compelling
when considering the relative returns to math and general ability previously presented
in Figure 3.2 for the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) cohort.
For college graduates, labor market returns to math have increased over time, with
the evidence pointing to MBTC as the driver. However, given the survey design of
the NLSY79, it is impossible to disentangle time eﬀects from life-cycle eﬀects. In
addition, estimating MBTC together with SBTC requires a time series dataset of the
US economy. As the American Community Survey (ACS) only has cross sections for
2009 and 2010, we use the DOT numerical requirements to exploit the time series
dimension of the CPS to further understand the importance of MBTC.5 Figure 3.4
shows relative log wage rates of college graduates split equally between high- and low-
math occupations6 relative to non-college wage rates. The wage rates are computed
using eﬃciency units of labor, with more detail on the precise computation found in
Appendix C.2. The relative wages of high-math occupations began to diverge in the
mid-1980s, which is consistent with the beginning of large-scale personal computer
adoption, a main driver of SBTC (Autor et al., 1998). Results suggest that, for college
graduates, labor augmenting technical change on high-math occupations has grown
about 16 percent per annum faster than on low-math occupations. Appendix C.2
provides details on the estimation method for both SBTC and MBTC over time using
the CPS.
5Appendix C.1 provides additional detail about the DOT aptitude measures used in this paper.
6The 50% split means that the cutoﬀ between low- and high-math occupations is such that 50%
of college graduates in 1974 work in high-math occupations. However, the results are not sensitive to
this cutoﬀ, e.g., using a top-third versus bottom two-thirds split yields similar quantitative results.
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Source: CPS. See Appendix C.2 on the detailed computation of log wage rates.
Figure 3.4: Relative Log Hourly Wages of High- to Low-Math Occupations
3.2.3 Fact 2: College and Work
Figure 3.5 depicts the relationship between college majors’ math credits and the
numerical skill requirements of occupations in 2010 for individuals aged 23 and 62.
The figure uses the individual-level observations with college major and occupation
information from the ACS, combined with the DOT numerical job requirements.7 All
individuals are first grouped by their college major and the average occupation math
requirement is computed, as there are multiple occupation outcomes within each college
major. This figure shows that occupation-specific math skills are highly correlated with
college-level math credits by college major, with a 0.65 correlation coeﬃcient.
3.2.4 Fact 3: College Math and Ability
Looking at the initial characteristics that lead to college major sorting, Figure 3.6
merges college-level math credits and mean SAT Math scores by college major from
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to individuals in the ACS. The
results illustrate that ex ante abilities are correlated with college-level math credits
with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.77. Thus, those with high-math abilities prior to
college, as measured by the average SAT Math scores of those graduating within a
7The ACS 2010 is used throughout. The ACS 2009 is the first year in which college major is
included. Note that the trends observed in the ACS 2010 are virtually identical to the ACS 2009.
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Source: ACS, NCES, DOT. Full-time, full-year, males, age 23-62.
Figure 3.5: Occupation Math Requirements and College-Level Math Credits by Major
Source: ACS, NCES. Full-time, full-year, males, age 23-62.
Figure 3.6: SAT Math Scores and College-Level Math Credits by Major
specific college major, are more likely to graduate from math intensive college majors,
as measured by college-level math credits.
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Source: ACS, NCES. College graduate males by birth cohort.
Figure 3.7: College Major Graduation Share by Cohorts
3.2.5 Other Measures
The ACS oﬀers a cross-sectional snapshot of college majors in 2010, from which
we construct a measure of how individuals’ college major choice has evolved. This
assumes that most individuals do not go back to school beyond the age of 30, and that
the ACS sample is representative of the population at every age group. Figure 3.7
illustrates the changes in degrees obtained, as measured by the share of graduates at
each math credit level of three sample cohorts between the 1960s and 1980s. The figure
shows a general and persistent pattern of college graduates shifting away from relative
high-math majors to low-math majors since the 1960s. Given the general trend toward
MBTC in the labor market, this pattern may seem puzzling. However, the leftward
shift in the quality of college students, suggested by Heckman and Mosso (2014), can
also explain a shift towards the left in Figure 3.7. The hypothesis to be tested in
this paper is to precisely determine the importance of MBTC combined with this shift
towards low-math majors in generating the observed increase in wage inequality within
college graduates.
Table 3.1 shows how other measures of ability are correlated with log wages, college
math credits and the usual SAT measures of ex ante math and verbal ability. Abili-
tyG, AbilityV and AbilityN are the DOT measures for general, verbal and numerical
aptitudes, respectively.8 The results presented here are for all individuals, with similar
8The DOT measures of ability are detailed in Appendix C.1.
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Table 3.1: Ability Measures and Wages
log(w) AbilityG AbilityV AbilityN SATM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AbilityG 0.601 1
AbilityV 0.563 0.966 1
AbilityN 0.846 0.766 0.719 1
SATM 0.609 0.598 0.571 0.725 1
SATV 0.387 0.565 0.551 0.502 0.796
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: ACS, NCES, DOT. Full-time, full-year, males, age 23-62.
results across cohorts. However, the correlation between log wages, general- and verbal
ability are smaller for younger cohorts. For example, individuals aged 28 to 32 in 2010
(the 1980 cohort) have a correlation between wages and general ability of 0.46, verbal
ability of 0.43 and math ability of 0.78. The population correlations for these same
measures is 0.60, 0.56, and 0.85, respectively (see Table 3.1). This diﬀerence may be
due to an age-eﬀect when first entering the labor market, i.e., individuals learn about
diﬀerent occupations and their skill requirements through experience.
The correlation for math measures (SATM, AbilityN) are 40-60 percent greater than
non-math measures. While this is possibly due to noise within the non-math measures,
the correlation between SATM and SATV is 0.80. This high correlation between math
and verbal scores, despite the much higher correlation between log wages and math
scores, further highlights the special significance of math as either a direct or indirect
measure of high-return skills in the labor market. Note that, with respect to the timing
of college-level education, the DOT ability measures are ex post assessments, whereas
the SAT ability measures are ex ante assessments.
3.3 Model
As this research is focused on the evolution of wage inequality over time, a general
equilibrium model is required to provide the time dynamics that would invariably be
ignored by estimating a regression model on the cross sections of available data. The
overlapping generations model used here features a unit mass of finitely lived agents
and a single representative firm.
3.3.1 Individuals
The model is loosely based on Hendricks and Schoellman (2014). However, the
schooling decision is modified to incorporate a choice between “college majors” and
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Figure 3.8: Timeline for Individuals
the fact that individuals face constraints based on their ability. Figure 3.8 provides
the basic model timeline for individuals. For each generation, there are two primary
periods with all decisions taking place in period 0 and the realization of the decisions
occurring in period 1. During period 0, individuals choose to either enter or forgo
college (college or non-college). At the beginning of period 1, individuals are about
18 years old. If they attempt college there are two outcomes: (1) drop out/fail or (2)
graduate with a specific degree characterized by specific acquired math skills, mi. Both
college graduates and dropouts enter the labor force in period 2, with individuals who
drop out/fail losing one period of income as an opportunity cost of attempting college.
Each subsequent period, individuals supply their general ability and acquired math
skills to firms in exchange for wages.
Individuals’ decisions within the model are straightforward. Individuals decide to
pursue college education or enter the labor market in period 0. This is the only choice
available to individuals in this model. Dropping out is determined by a single ability
cutoﬀ. The college major “choice” is simplified to a direct mapping from human capital,
hm, to acquired math skills,m, without an explicit choice. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) and
Zafar (2013) find strong evidence that men optimize their education choices in order
to earn the highest wage return. Also exploring men’s education choices, Paglin and
Rufolo (1990) find empirical evidence that men choose college majors based on their
math ability. This result is similar to that of Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014),
who show that many people attempt math-heavy college majors, but learn about their
abilities through failure. These people move into college majors with lighter math loads,
with the failure and “drop” process repeating until the student’s ability is matched to
the math content of the college major or they drop out. Thus, for men, combining these
results points to a direct mapping from initial ability to the highest possible college
math outcome.
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The education choice is determined by weighing the financial benefits against the
utility and opportunity costs (lost wages) of studying. Markets are complete, such
that income maximization and consumption maximization yield the same results, with
discounting of  = 1
1+r
. Thus, the individuals’ objective function is:
max
si
(
NX
t=2

1
1 + r
t
E

p()!et(; m) + (1  p())!ut()
   i;
NX
t=1

1
1 + r
t
E(!ut())
)
: (3.1)
Individuals make a schooling choice, si 2 fe; ug, between attending college or not.
Individual wages are given by !ijt, with j = fe; ug denoting the college graduate (ed-
ucated) or non-college (uneducated) outcomes. Wages are a function of individuals’
initial general ability, i. College-graduate wages are, in addition, also a function of
individuals’ initial math ability, im. The probability of graduating from college is rep-
resented by p and depends on an individuals’ initial general ability, i. Individuals are
heterogeneous across initial general ability, i, initial math ability, im, and taste for
college,  i.
While initial ability is defined in terms of i and im, agents are aware that ability
translates into human capital, hi, through a noisy process, that aﬀects their perfor-
mance both at school and at work. This process is defined as hi = exp(i + i) and
him = exp(
i
m + 
i) for general and math human capital, respectively. Individuals’ ex
ante estimate of their general and math human capital is given by h^ and h^m. Students
generally overestimate their human capital when making schooling choices, which we
call overconfidence (for an empirical motivation see Bordalo et al., 2014, and references
therein). This overconfidence is seen in individuals’ ex ante general and math human
capital estimates: h^ = exp( + ^) and h^m = exp(m + ^), where E(^) > E().
College is not reversible and dropping out occurs only if an individual does not meet
the minimum graduation requirement set by h. I.e., p(i) = 1 if hi() > h otherwise
p = 0 and the individual drops out of college.
Math human capital has no value in the labor market unless an individual studies
math in college. We will approximate this college major matching process by allocating
math credits directly to individuals based on their ability. Acquired math skill in
college, mi(hm), is an increasing function of math human capital, @m
i(hm)
@hm
> 0.
The wages for college educated individuals are determined by,
!iet = wet
 
wheth
i + wmetm
i(hm)

exp(it); (3.2)
65
where wet are general wage returns to a college degree for general human capital (in-
dexed h) and acquired math skill (indexed m). A transitory luck component, , is
drawn each period.
The wages for uneducated individuals are,
!iut = whuth
i exp(it); (3.3)
as math human capital has no value unless refined in college. Uneducated individuals
face the same transitory luck component, , as educated individuals.
3.3.2 Firms
A representative firm hires college and non-college labor to produce a final good
(Yt). The production function is a CES between non-college and college labor. College
labor is a nested-CES between general human capital and math. Non-college labor, by
definition, only supplies general human capital.
Yt =
h
Lhut + (1  )

 (AtLhet)
 + (1  ) (AtMtLmet)
=i1= (3.4)
The elasticity of substitution between education types is 1
1  . The elasticity of sub-
stitution between general human capital and acquired math skills is 1
1  . Labor shares
are comprised of two components for educated individuals, general human capital and
acquired math skills, and general human capital alone for uneducated individuals. For-
mally, labor shares are defined as,
Lhjt =
Z
i
(1(si=j)h
i)di; 8j = e; u and Lmet =
Z
i
(1(si=e)m
i)di:
At is skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and Mt is math-biased technical change
(MBTC) over time, with growth rates at and mt for SBTC and MBTC, respectively.
Thus, SBTC is At = (1 + at)At 1 and MBTC is Mt = (1 + mt)Mt 1.
The model solutions follow from the firm’s cost minimization problem. If we define
college labor output as,
Yet =

 (Lhet)
 + (1  ) (MtLmet)
1=
;
with a price of pet = wet, given perfect competition, then the relative demand for college
labor output from the firm’s minimization is,

Yet
Lhut

demand
=

At (1  )

whut
wet
 1
1 
: (3.5)
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Firms demand relatively more college labor when the wage rate decreases or college
labor productivity (At) increases. The relative demand for acquired math skills (“college
math”) from the firm’s solution is,

Lmet
Lhet

demand
=

Mt (1  )

whet
wmet
 1
1 
: (3.6)
Firms demand relatively more college math when the wage rate decreases or the pro-
ductivity of acquired math skills (Mt) increases.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
The general equilibrium conditions are dependent on the individuals’ and the firm’s
optimization problems.
An equilibrium, given wage rates fwhut; wet; whet; wmetg, is defined by:
1. The education choice, si = fe; ug, that maximizes the individual problem, subject
to the graduation constraint hi  h;
2. The demand for labor fLhut; Lhet; Lmetg, that minimizes the firm’s production
cost; and
3. Labor markets clear, both for general human capital, (Lhjt)demand = (Lhjt)supply
for j = fe; ug, and for college math, (Lmet)demand = (Lmet)supply.
3.3.4 Dynamics
To compute actual wage rates, the final good price is normalized to one, pt = 1.
Using the unit cost of producing one unit of output, it is straight forward to derive all
wages from Equations (3.4)-(3.6). The wage rates of college labor input are,
whet = wet
1=

1 +
Mt (1  )


Lmet
Lhet
(1 )=
(3.7)
and
wmet = whet
Mt (1  )


Lhet
Lmet
1 
; (3.8)
where
wet = At(1  )1=

1 +

At (1  )

Lhut
Yet
(1 )=
: (3.9)
SBTC (At) increases the returns to all college labor. There are two channels that
increase the returns to math college, (1) a direct technical change eﬀect, and (2) an
indirect supply eﬀect. First, MBTC (Mt) increases the returns to college math directly.
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Second, a relatively faster increase in general human capital compared to the supply of
college math, Lhet
Lmet
, given an elasticity parameter of  < 1, also increases the wage rate
on college math, wmet. Therefore, consistent with our main hypothesis, if individuals
are constrained in learning math, or new college entrants are unable to learn/study
math, it is possible that the returns to math increase faster than the returns to college,
leading to a larger spread between the top and bottom percentile wages within the
college educated group. As a consequence, the larger the absolute number of college
entrants, given that every new marginal entrant will have a lower ability level, the larger
the post-education wage inequality. For completeness the wage rate of uneducated
workers is determined by,
whut = wet

At (1  )

Yet
Lhut
1 
; (3.10)
where the non-college relative wage decreases with SBTC, which is consistent with the
SBTC literature.
3.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model to 1980. The model parameters can be grouped into four
categories: (1) standard parameter values, f;Ng; (2) individual-specific parame-
ters, f; ;  ; ^; ; g; (3) college-specific parameters, f0; 1; h;mg; and (4) firm-
specific parameters f; ; ; g. Each category of parameters is discussed in separate
subsections below. The calibration procedure estimates all parameter values jointly.
To generate the time trends, the growth rates of productivity fjtg (SBTC and MBTC)
are calibrated to match the rise in college attainment and the college wage premium.
3.4.1 General Parameters
The model has five-year time periods and is simulated for seven periods, from 1980
to 2010. We start the model economy at 1980 for two reasons: (1) the 1960 cohort
of the NLSY79 is the first reasonable target available, i.e., individuals making their
college decisions in 1980; and (2) the Vietnam War distorted the college decision of
cohorts born before 1960, as the draft could be avoided by college enrollment (see
Lemieux and Card, 2001). In addition, the decompositions in Section 3.2 show that
income divergence began around 1980, with a relatively flat trend between 1975 and
1980. The model uses a standard discount factor of  = 0:9 per period, which implies
a discount rate of approximately two percent per year.
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We set N = 9, meaning that individuals live for nine periods after the college/no-
college decision. Thus, each period contains nine generations and the modeled working
life-time of an individual covers the equivalent of 45-years. As the period 0 decision is
assumed to take place around the age of 18, the model covers the age range of 18 to
63. The simulation accounts for the baby boom/bust that generates diﬀerent cohort
sizes. However, the results are not sensitive to these cohort size diﬀerences.
3.4.2 Individual and Education Specific Parameters
The individual and education parameters interact directly. Therefore, this sub-
section discusses these two parameter groups together. Given that the NLSY79 was
administered to individuals aged 14 to 22 in 1979, and model simulations start in 1980,
we drop the youngest individuals for NLSY79 targets described below. That is, we
match the 1960 cohort definition, only including individuals born before 1963.
Initial ability and human capital. The two types of initial ability, general ()
and math (m), are distributed normally. Formally,   N(0; 2) and m  N(0; 2).
The correlation () between initial general ability and initial math ability is set to
 = 0:9367, matching the correlation between SAT I and SAT I Math scores in the
ACS, E(m) = .
To generate the mapping between initial ability measures ( and m) and human
capital (h and hm), the noisy process  is assumed N(0; 2 ). The ex ante process ^ is
also assumed N(^; 2 ).
Schooling choice. Preferences for studying impact the initial college/no college
schooling choice. Study preferences are defined by , which can be considered an
individual’s taste for college. While individuals sort into college based on their initial
ability, Figure 3.9 shows that this sorting is not perfect. Thus,   N(0; 2 ), where a
negative  is a cost and a positive  is “love” for studying.
Schooling outcome. There are two outcomes for those who attempt college edu-
cation: (1) dropout/failure or (2) graduate in a college major characterized by math
credits. In the model, the dropout rate is governed by a minimum human capital
standard, h, which is assumed constant over time. Those who do not drop out of col-
lege accumulate a representative measure of acquired math skill in college (mi), with
functional form,
mi = min fm;max (0; 0 + 1 exp(hm))g : (3.11)
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Source: NLSY79. Males born before 1963 (1960 cohort). Standardized test scores as computed by
the method of Altonji et al. (2012a).
Figure 3.9: Ability Distribution by Education Type
Math acquired in college is subject to a cap, m, which is set to match the share of
individuals with 21 or more math credits in the 1960 cohort. The choice of 21 math
credits is driven by returns to math credits in the ACS sample. A regression of math
credits and math credits squared on wages, controlling for a number of characteristics,
for full-time full-year male employees, suggests an increasing and concave relationship
for the returns up-to 21 college math credits (see Figure 3.10). The returns to additional
credits above 21 flattens and then drops sharply at 40 credits. These 40-credit college
majors are primarily math majors. We argue that numerical skills and the tools learned
in mathematics are valuable on the job market, but we do not, per se, think that esoteric
math courses (e.g., chaos and dynamical systems) are the main driving force. However,
the US share of college graduates with 40 credits is small.9
The number of college graduates studying zero math credits can be seen in Figure
3.7. These individuals will benefit from SBTC, but not from MBTC. We define 0
such that the share of college graduates from the 1960 cohort with zero math credits
is matched. Given the mapping function for mi, 0 will be a negative value.
9Only 1.6 percent of college graduates within the entire 2009/2010 sample obtain 40 math credits.
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Source: ACS, NCES. Math credit returns are computed from a regression of hourly log wages of full-
time (at least 35 hours of work and 40 weeks per year) male workers aged 25 to 59 on math credits,
math credits squared, age, age squared, dummies for education, race, marital status, and year.
Figure 3.10: ACS Returns to College Math Credits
Additional wage component. The model features a standard luck component (e.g.,
Storesletten et al., 2001) in wages over the life-cycle. For the precise process used in
this paper, see Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010). This luck component is i.i.d. with mean
zero and standard deviation .
Remaining moment conditions. The six structural parameters that do not have
a one-to-one mapping to empirical moments are estimated by matching seven US data
targets simultaneously. The seven moments that govern individual actions pertain
to the 1960 cohort (i.e., individuals making education choices in 1980) or the year
1980. We group the moments that we believe to be particularly informative of a given
parameters.
 h is governed by the college dropout rate in 1980. Although there is a wide range
of estimates for the dropout rate, we use estimates by Bound et al. (2010) for two
reasons: (1) the authors provide estimates disaggregated by gender; and (2) their
definition aligns with our interpretation of college dropouts. That is, the college
dropout rate defined as the share of all individuals age 25 in 1980, who have some
college but lack a four-year college degree. More importantly for our research,
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the results presented below are not sensitive to the precise value of the dropout
rate. Note that the model generates an increasing college dropout rate over time,
which is a characteristic that the literature agrees on (for example, Bailey and
Dynarski, 2011; Bound et al., 2010, both show a rise in college dropout rates).
 ^, ,  are determined by the average general ability of college graduates
(NLSY79, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)), the correlation of high
school GPA and freshman college GPA of 0.4 (Rothstein, 2004), and the aver-
age ability of non-college workers (NLSY79, AFQT). That is, h provides a clear
dropout cutoﬀ, with overconfidence, ^, contributing to the dropout rate, i.e.,
people attempt college who cannot graduate. Uncertainty over actual abilities
is generated by , with a large literature suggesting that SAT scores and high
school performance are an imperfect measure of college performance, and signif-
icant information about own ability being revealed through studying at a college
level.10 Lastly,  generates imperfect sorting, since individuals have idiosyn-
cratic preferences for school, which translates into a larger variance in the ability
of college graduates. This variance is used to explain diﬀerences in the average
ability between college and non-college individuals.
  and 1 are determined through three 1980 relative log wage targets: NC90-
NC10, C90-C50, and C90-C10. These second moments cover the main intra-group
inequality measures that we believe are important. Note that the model has an
extra wage target. This additional second moment will provide information on the
relevant parameters determining variance: ,  and  . Thus, this extra wage
target is important in matching both first and second moments when analyzing
wage inequality in the model.
3.4.3 Firm-Specific Parameters
There are four parameters associated with the firm that must be pinned down in
1980, along with two time trends.
Time invariant firm parameters. Two parameters are set outside the estimation
procedure. More precisely, the parameter  is set within the range of standard estimate
for college to non-college labor elasticities (see Autor et al., 2008, 1998), and the share
parameter on human capital is normalized,  = 0:5.
10Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2013) find that 45 percent of the college dropout rate at Berea
College (a small liberal arts college in Kentucky) can be explained by students learning their academic
performance in the first two years of college.
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The parameters  and  are pinned down by matching the share of college graduates
(age 25 to 30) in 1980 and the college wage premium in 1980. The resulting elasticity
parameter is in line with estimates in Appendix C.2,  = 0:707.11
Time trends. Given the definition of SBTC and MBTC, we normalize A and M to
one in 1980. By definition, a rise in At will aﬀect both the returns to college ability
and math equally, but a rise in Mt will only increase the returns to math. We restrict
the growth rate of SBTC such that a;t 2 [0:018; 0:028], which follows from the range
of estimates found in Table 2 of Autor et al. (2008). The two growth rates are then
calibrated to match the rise in the share of college graduates from 1980 to 2010, along
with the rise in the college wage premium. This process yields a SBTC growth rate
of a = 0:027 per annum, which lies at the upper range of possible estimates. As
relatively high SBTC decreases the eﬀect of MBTC (Section 3.3.4), the SBTC growth
rate estimate is conservative. The calibration suggests that MBTC is substantial during
this time period, with m = 0:043. We present a counterfactual is Section 3.5.1 to
understand how important this precise value of m is for the model.
3.4.4 Calibration Summary
Table 3.2 summarizes the estimated and calibrated parameters, with estimated
parameters above the center line and calibrated parameters at the bottom.
The 1980 data targets used in pinning down the calibrated parameters are sum-
marized in Table 3.3. The model does well in matching all targets. It only slightly
overpredicts the average ability of college graduates and the C90-C50 wage diﬀerential
of college graduates. For the time trends, the model is unable to match the full rise
in the share of college graduates by 2010. However, the model is able to match the
share of new college graduates in 2010. This discrepancy can be explained by the draft
during the Vietnam War generating above average college graduation rates (Lemieux
and Card, 2001).
11Alternatively, using the ACS data, but instead computing elasticities across occupations rather
than time, as in Appendix C.2, yields similar results as the calibration, with the interval of plus/minus
one standard suggesting  2 [0:33; 0:72]. However, since this method is subject to various assumptions
related to the computation of relative wage returns, eﬃciency units and grouping of occupations, our
preferred estimate is using the calibrated elasticity.
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Table 3.2: Calibration Summary
Parameter Value Source / Type
 0.9 standard discounting
N 9 retirement at 63 (5 year periods)
 0.367 transitory wage luck (Guvenen and Kuruscu, 2010)
i  N(0; 2) initial ability NLSY79
 0.597 elasticity parameter: college to non-college (Autor et al., 2008)
 0.5 ability share parameter - normalized
A0t 1.0 SBTC 1980 - normalized
M0t 1.0 MBTC 1980 - normalized
 0.142 initial ability
^ 0.229 overconfidence
 0.205 unknown ability component
 0.042 utility of studying
0 -2.953 zero math outcome
1 2.769 math skill slope
h 0.109 minimum college requirement
m 0.625 maximum math credits
 0.411 college share parameter
 0.707 elasticity parameter: ability to math
a 0.027 SBTC growth rate
m 0.043 MBTC growth rate
Table 3.3: Targets Summary
Target Data (1980) Model
Fraction 0 Math Credits 0.113 0.113
Fraction 21 Math Credits 0.118 0.118
College Dropout Rate 0.550 0.548
corr(; h) 0.400 0.401
college graduate 0.805 0.821
non college worker -0.282 -0.275
C90-C50 0.568 0.579
C90-C10 1.174 1.154
NC90-NC10 1.104 1.072
College Wage Premium 0.247 0.247
Young College Graduates 0.241 0.247
2010 College Graduates 0.301 0.281
2010 College Wage Premium 0.493 0.495
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Table 3.4: US Wage Inequality & Model Results
Relative Log Wages
Year 90-10 90-50 50-10
All
Data 1980 116 55 62
2010 150 77 73
Model 1980 112 55 57
2010 126 67 59
% Explained 42 52 23
College
Data 1980 117 57 61
2010 145 74 72
Model 1980 118 59 58
2010 144 71 73
% Explained 92 68 131
Notes:  Moment targeted in the calibration.
3.5 Results
The model accurately captures a variety of inequality dynamics, including many of
the general wage trends and all of the intra-college group wage decomposition between
1980 and 2010. These results are driven by the introduction of MBTC into a standard
SBTC framework, with the importance of MBTC highlighted through the counterfac-
tual presented in Section 3.5.1. Table 3.4 compares the total US inequality trends and
the modeled results. The base model explains nearly half of the rise in inequality of
the aggregate US male population.12
The model’s strength lies in explaining intra-college income inequality, given that
MBTC only impacts educated individuals. The model explains almost all the trends
for college graduates, both at the top and bottom. At the other end of the income
distribution, none of the aggregate non-college trends (NC90-NC10, NC-90-NC50 and
NC50-NC10) are well explained. Figure 3.11 shows that the model matches the NC80-
A50 and NC50-A50 wage evolution, but it predicts a slight fall in both the NC90-A50
and only a small fall in the NC20-A50 and NC10-A50 percentile (not pictured). In
contrast, the data shows a mild increase in the NC90-A50 relative wage and a large
decrease in the NC20-A50 and NC10-A50 relative wage. That is, the model is able
to replicate the average uneducated worker’s wage, but not the extremes. These un-
matched trends are unsurprising, as the model ignores the human capital accumulation
12The rise in the fraction of college graduates and the college wage premium are matched by con-
struction.
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(a) Bottom (b) Top
Figure 3.11: Model Wage Trend Decomposition
of uneducated individuals (e.g., unemployment, dropping out of high school or complet-
ing vocational 2-year college programs) and MBTC only aﬀects college labor directly.
Therefore, the model is more suited to predict income trends within the top half of
the distribution, which includes all college graduates. Both Figures 3.11a and 3.11b
show an almost perfect matching of the college distribution across the top (C90-A50,
C80-A50), median (C50-A50) and bottom (C20-A50, C10-A50) deciles.
In addition to matching inequality trends, the model also preforms well in matching
trends not directly targeted, such as ability distributions by school outcome, dropout
rates, etc. Matching these trends is important when assessing the validity of the model
and mechanism put forth in this paper. The following paragraphs discuss each trend
in detail.
Initial ability. The NLSY79 and NLSY97 show that ex ante ability, as measured by
the AFQT of college graduates, has fallen from 0.805 to 0.775. Since individuals were
aged 12 to 16 in the NLSY97 sample, the natural comparison of college cohorts in the
model is 2000-2005. The model slightly overpredicts the average initial ability in 1980
and predicts a fall to 0.769 by 2000 and 0.754 by 2005. While the fall is slightly larger
than observed from the NLSY79 to NLSY97, the estimates are close to suggest that
the model is not generating the above wage trends through an incorrect composition
of college graduates.
Dropout rate. The model generates a rise in the college dropout rate from the
matched target of 55 percent in 1980 to 59 percent by 2010. Bound et al. (2010) show
that the non-completion rate for males aged 25 went from about 55 percent in 1980 to
about 60 percent in 2000. By the year 2000 the model generates a dropout rate of 58
percent, just shy of the data estimates.
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(a) 1980 Cohort Data versus Model (b) Cohort Evolution
Figure 3.12: College Major Graduation Share by Cohorts
College math credits (0 and 21). The model shifts each subsequent cohort to-
wards lower college math levels. In the 1960 cohort 11.3 percent of college graduates
(in both the data and model) had zero math credits. By the 1980 cohort this number
had risen to 14.9 percent in the data and 14.8 percent in the model. Looking at the
fraction of individuals with 21 credits or more, the data falls from 11.8 percent for
the 1960 cohort to 10.0 percent for the 1980 cohort. The model replicates just over
one-third of this drop, generating a fall from 11.8 to 11.1 percent from 1980 to 2010
for new college graduates.
College majors. Figure 3.12 graphs the share of college graduates over all math
outcomes (“college majors”). As math is a continuous variable within the model, Figure
3.12 is computed by scaling all math outcomes such that the maximum math credits
earned is 21, and then rounded up to the nearest three credit equivalent. Figure 3.12
(left panel) compares the share of college graduates for the 1980 cohort of the model
and data. The model, using a simple math technology, does well in matching the overall
shape of college graduates over math outcomes. However, the continuous math outcome
variable in the model leads to a smaller mass around three credits compared to the
data. It should be noted that a large share of college majors might only require three
math credits to graduate, suggesting a kink in the college math “production function.”
Additionally, reclassifying college credits in statistics as college math credits does not
aﬀect the share of individuals with zero math credits, but does generate a larger spread
(away from three math credits). Given that the model estimates lie between the two
types of math measures (with and without statistics) and the model studies aggregates
at the top and bottom of the wage distribution, it is not of first order importance for
the results to generate the mass at three credits. Figure 3.12 (right panel) shows the
evolution of college graduates by math credits across cohorts in the model. The change
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Table 3.5: US Wage Inequality & Constant Skill Supply
Relative Log Wages
90-10 90-50 50-10
College (2010)
Data 145 74 72
Benchmark 144 71 73
Partial Equilibrium 140 69 71
% Explained Skill Supply 15 17 7
over time in the model mimics the general pattern observed in the US (Figure 3.7).
3.5.1 Counterfactual
We present two counterfactuals: (1) a partial equilibrium exercise, where the grad-
uating cohort attributes remain fixed at the 1960 cohort, and (2) eliminating MBTC
by setting m;t = 0.
Supply Eﬀects. Maintaining the attributes of the 1960 cohort for all successive
cohorts eliminates the supply eﬀects from the results. Attributes here refer to the
distribution of ex ante and ex post skills. That is, the counterfactual assesses the
importance of the falling ability levels of college graduates in driving inequality. Table
3.5 shows how much of the rise in wage inequality in the benchmark is driven by the new
“marginal” college graduate being of worse quality (in terms of math skills and general
human capital) in 2010 compared to 1980. The aggregate eﬀect is shown in the last
row, stating the percentage contribution of changing skill supplies to the rising wage
inequality from 1980 to 2010. Of the total wage inequality (90th to 10th percentile
college graduate) generated in the benchmark model, 15 percent of the increase in
inequality is explained by a deterioration of the skills at the bottom relative to the top
graduate from 1980 to 2010. For the 90th to 50th percentile the explanatory power is
slightly larger at 17 percent.
MBTC. The removal of the MBTC mechanism clearly reveals the contribution of the
returns to acquired math skills. The counterfactual model predicts more individuals
attempt college, with a college dropout rate of 60.4 percent in 2010, and more indi-
viduals graduate from college, with the share of college graduates increasing to 28.6
percent in 2010 from 28.1 percent in the benchmark model. The share of zero-math
credit graduates increases to 15.9 percent and the share of individuals with 21 credits
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Table 3.6: US Wage Inequality & Counterfactual Results
Relative Log Wages
Year 90-10 90-50 50-10
All
Data 2010 150 77 73
SBTC + MBTC 2010 126 67 59
SBTC 2010 129 68 62
% SBTC Explained 51 55 42
College
Data 2010 145 74 72
SBTC + MBTC 2010 144 71 73
SBTC 2010 118 60 58
% SBTC Explained 3 4 1
decreases to 10.8 percent by 2010. Simultaneously, the average quality of a college
graduate drops from 0.744 to 0.712 in terms of initial ability.
Table 3.6 compares the 2010 wage inequality levels between the data, the bench-
mark model and the counterfactual model results, omitting the 1980 values, as they are
identical to Table 3.4 by construction. At an aggregate level, the counterfactual model
is marginally better than the benchmark model in matching broad income inequality
trends, particularly at the bottom of the wage distribution. However, these broad
measurements hide the intra-college inequality trends that are ignored by the coun-
terfactual model. The second part of Table 3.6 shows that the counterfactual model
is unable to match any of the trends in wage inequality between college graduates,
explaining only one to four percent of the rise in inequality from 1980 to 2010.
Figure 3.13 further highlights how the counterfactual model matches the aggregated
income inequality trends for the wrong reasons. The counterfactual predicts a sharp
increase in wages for the bottom college deciles and a sharp fall for wages of the top
non-college deciles. This first point is driven by higher returns to the general human
capital of college graduates (relative to math). The non-college results are driven
by composition. That is, more low ability students enter and graduate from college,
eﬀectively decreasing the ability of the top non-college deciles.
The mechanisms of SBTC and MBTC work in opposite directions for the bottom
of the college distribution. SBTC alone benefits all college graduates in wage terms.
The bottom deciles, in particular, gain compared with the average individual in the
economy. Further highlighting the broad power of the SBTC mechanism, the counter-
factual pushes the income of the C20 group above the A50 wage, while the C10 wage
approaches parity with the A50 wage. In contrast, MBTC is eﬀective at only increase
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Figure 3.13: US Wage Inequality & Counterfactual Results
the top income deciles, leaving the bottom deciles with decreasing or stagnant wages.
Thus, only the combination of these two diﬀerent technical change concepts can gen-
erate the observed wage inequality trends of the US male college graduate population,
along with part of the divergence in wages across the entire US male population.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of math in determining both inter- and intra-education
group wage inequality. The connection between ex ante math abilities, college math,
and the labor demand for math skills provides a simple and powerful mechanism, ex-
plaining a large component of male wage inequality in the US. The estimated structural
model highlights the importance of MBTC in explaining both aggregate wage inequal-
ity and the wage trends at the extremes of the college distribution. The model is
also able to generate average trends for both college and non-college groups, closely
matching the general trends achieved by SBTC alone.
Given the results, there are a number of interesting research extensions. As we
extend the research on the determinants of wage inequality from a post-education
perspective (Huggett et al., 2011; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009a) to a pre-college
education perspective, we assume initial math ability is determined prior to college.
Given the central role of math, studying the origins of initial math skills is of primary
importance in determining college math outcomes and is a natural first extension of
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the MBTC mechanism presented here. A second research extension focuses on the
gender dimension of education choices, where the specific characteristics of college
majors favored by women are assessed. While men optimize their education choices to
maximize pecuniary outcomes and choose high-math college majors given initial ability
constraints, women exhibit more complex preferences with respect to non-pecuniary
outcomes that seem to distort the education decision. In ongoing work, we study
women’s college decisions in a life-cycle model that accounts for atrophy and repair of
skills due to career breaks.
Part III
Appendices
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Results Appendix
Tables A.1 and A.2 provide the IV-GLS coeﬃcient estimates by broad educational
groups.
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Table A.1: IV-GLS Estimation Results: Less Than College
VARIABLES Base Skill Skill Equivalent
(1) (2) (3)
Experience 0.153*** (0.015) 0.125*** (0.013) 0.086*** (0.009)
Experience2  100 -0.442*** (0.064) -0.399*** (0.067) -0.383*** (0.065)
Experience3  100 0.010*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002)
Old Job -0.027** (0.011) -0.030*** (0.011) -0.029*** (0.011)
Firm Tenure -0.010** (0.005) -0.010** (0.005) -0.025*** (0.005)
Firm Tenure2  100 0.004 (0.027) -0.003 (0.028) 0.044 (0.029)
Career Tenure 0.035*** (0.007) -0.006 (0.009)
Career Tenure2  100 -0.293*** (0.075) -0.048 (0.093)
Career Tenure3  100 0.008*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
M Tenure 0.012 (0.012) 0.064*** (0.020)
M Tenure2  100 -0.057 (0.150) -0.944** (0.453)
M Tenure3  100 -0.001 (0.005) 0.049* (0.028)
V Tenure 0.011 (0.012) 0.009 (0.018)
V Tenure2  100 -0.150 (0.146) 0.320 (0.381)
V Tenure3  100 0.006 (0.005) -0.013 (0.022)
S Tenure 0.022* (0.012) 0.048** (0.020)
S Tenure2  100 -0.198 (0.142) -1.192** (0.487)
S Tenure3  100 0.004 (0.005) 0.044 (0.033)
T Tenure -0.001 (0.012) 0.047*** (0.014)
T Tenure2  100 0.042 (0.141) -0.280 (0.268)
T Tenure3  100 0.001 (0.005) 0.009 (0.014)
Observations 17,339 17,316 17,274
Individuals 1,426 1,426 1,424
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
See notes Table 1.4 and text for details.
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Table A.2: IV-GLS Estimation Results: College
VARIABLES Base Skill Skill Equivalent
(1) (2) (3)
Experience 0.048** (0.023) 0.027 (0.031) 0.040** (0.018)
Experience2  100 -0.146 (0.117) -0.046 (0.119) -0.021 (0.117)
Experience3  100 0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004)
Old Job -0.030* (0.017) -0.042** (0.018) -0.038** (0.018)
Firm Tenure -0.016** (0.008) -0.020** (0.009) -0.029*** (0.009)
Firm Tenure2  100 0.028 (0.045) 0.052 (0.051) 0.076 (0.049)
Career Tenure 0.071*** (0.012) 0.010 (0.018)
Career Tenure2  100 -0.581*** (0.142) -0.095 (0.194)
Career Tenure3  100 0.014*** (0.005) 0.001 (0.007)
M Tenure 0.024 (0.021) 0.049 (0.030)
M Tenure2  100 -0.132 (0.272) -0.443 (0.558)
M Tenure3  100 0.003 (0.010) 0.021 (0.030)
V Tenure 0.028 (0.023) 0.079*** (0.029)
V Tenure2  100 -0.315 (0.297) -1.396*** (0.522)
V Tenure3  100 0.007 (0.011) 0.062** (0.027)
S Tenure 0.020 (0.024) -0.005 (0.035)
S Tenure2  100 -0.052 (0.328) 0.603 (0.722)
S Tenure3  100 0.002 (0.013) -0.034 (0.042)
T Tenure 0.023 (0.023) 0.042 (0.029)
T Tenure2  100 -0.342 (0.305) -0.674 (0.514)
T Tenure3  100 0.010 (0.012) 0.016 (0.027)
Observations 6,752 6,733 6,655
Individuals 626 626 624
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
See notes Table 1.4 and text for details.
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B Appendix: Chapter 2
B.1 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY)
The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of individuals aged 14 to 22 in
1979. Surveys were conducted on an annual basis until 1994 and biannually thereafter.
The original sample included 12,686 men and women.
Wage information is reported at the survey dates, and is adjusted to constant 2000
US Dollars. Survey observations without wage data are dropped from the sample, as
are those without occupation information. We also drop individuals with military occu-
pations as-of the interview date because their wage observation may not be determined
by general labor market forces.
The NLSY sample provides weekly observations for employment status from which
career breaks are constructed. Thus, each observation in the data set has two measures
of employment gaps in weeks: (1) cumulative length of all gaps; and (2) length of
prior gap. These gap measures account for employment status values in a conservative
manner. I.e., the six labor force status values (e.g., unemployed, active military service)
used when an occupational code is not provided are considered unemployment spells.
This means that the number and length of gaps is likely overestimated, reducing the
eﬀect of each gap on wages. The reason military service is considered a work gap
concerns how employers view this experience. If the tasks performed while undertaking
military service are relevant to the formal labor market, then military service could be
considered employment. However, it is not clear how relevant military service tasks are
to employers, and coding these values as unemployment is a conservative assumption.
Note that individuals employed full-time within military service were dropped prior
to the employment gap variable construction, leaving only individuals with short-term
military service.
After accounting for missing and inconsistent information, the data set contains
individual-level observations across time for wages, occupation, employment gap mea-
sures and multiple individual characteristics, such as gender and education. Thus, the
final sample contains 5,652 individuals, of which 2,782 (49 percent) are males.
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B.2 Occupational Information Network (O*net) and
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
The Occupational Information Network (O*net) database contains detailed descrip-
tive information for more than 900 occupations, and succeeds the Dictionary of Oc-
cupational Titles (DOT). Whereas the DOT is based on direct expert observations
of occupations, the O*net sends questionnaires to a random sample of workers based
on their occupations. Each worker completes one-quarter of the questions, which are
organized into eight broad categories. Three categories are of particular interest:
 Knowledge: Biology, Building and Construction, Chemistry, Computers and
Electronics, Engineering and Technology, English Language, Mathematics, Me-
chanical, Physics
 Skill: Equipment Maintenance, Equipment Selection, Installation, Mathematics,
Operation and Control, Reading Comprehension, Repairing, Science, Technology
Design
 Ability: Trouble Shooting, Deductive Reasoning, Inductive Reasoning, Informa-
tion Ordering, Mathematical Reasoning, Number Facility, Oral Comprehension,
Written Comprehension
Besides recording standard survey questions regarding family status and work, the
NLSY respondents took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
in the Summer and Fall of 1980, which was administered by the US Departments
of Defense and Military Services. The ASVAB was designed to provide high school
graduates with better career guidance compared to a simple general or academic ability
test. The test components can be grouped into four major skill types/components:
1. Math is composed of “Arithmetic Reasoning” and “Mathematics Knowledge.”
2. Verbal is composed of “Word Knowledge” and “Paragraph Comprehension.”
3. Technical is composed of “Auto and Shop, Mechanical Comprehension” and “Elec-
tronics Information.”
4. Science is composed of “General Science Knowledge.”
In an eﬀort to make career matching easier for new high school graduates, the
ASVAB Career Exploration Program decided to match occupational information from
O*net data to the ASVAB test components. For this purpose, 26 occupational de-
scriptors of the O*net were matched to the ASVAB test sections listed above. The
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descriptors include information of knowledge, skill and ability required in preforming
each O*net occupation. As the list of O*net descriptors above reveals, each has a
natural mapping into math, verbal, technical and science skill components. The map-
ping to four ASVAB components was determined by experts using a six-point scale
ranging from “Highly related” to “Not at all related.” Experts came from the field of
industrial/organizational psychology, general psychology, and psychometrics.
B.3 Results Appendix: Depreciation Rates
Table B.1 includes part-time workers. The results are similar in sign and magnitude
to the results for full-time workers only (see Table 2.3).
Table B.2 provides GLS results for the base regression outlined in Table 2.3. The
results are similar in sign and magnitude to the OLS estimates for full-time workers.
Table B.3 shows depreciation rates for male and female workers using GLS to ac-
count for serially correlated errors. The coeﬃcients are slightly smaller for college
educated women compared to OLS. However, the general hypothesis still holds, with
high math occupations experiencing larger wage penalties for gaps and high verbal
(and science) occupations oﬀ-setting some of the penalty. In addition, the results now
also suggest a penalty in highly technical occupations. For non-college women the
skill-specific depreciation rates are now statistically significant, albeit still smaller than
those for college graduates.
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Table B.1: Depreciation Rates
VARIABLES LTC C+ LTC C+ LTC C+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Part-time -0.097*** -0.146*** -0.070*** -0.103*** -0.069*** -0.103***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015)
Math -0.084* 0.400*** -0.097** 0.367*** -0.061 0.442***
(0.047) (0.111) (0.048) (0.113) (0.049) (0.116)
Verbal -0.012 0.631*** -0.004 0.686*** -0.027 0.628***
(0.040) (0.095) (0.042) (0.095) (0.043) (0.098)
Science -0.388*** -0.904*** -0.392*** -0.866*** -0.406*** -0.949***
(0.051) (0.155) (0.054) (0.154) (0.054) (0.160)
Technical 0.599*** 0.376*** 0.613*** 0.375*** 0.597*** 0.377***
(0.037) (0.112) (0.038) (0.114) (0.039) (0.118)
Cumm Gap 0.347*** 0.484*** 0.353*** 0.487***
(0.033) (0.067) (0.033) (0.067)
Last Gap -0.402*** -0.664*** -0.398*** -0.629***
(0.049) (0.167) (0.049) (0.167)
Cumm Gap M -0.068*** -0.091*** -0.066*** -0.085***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
Last Gap M -0.670** -1.291** -0.473 -1.092*
(0.290) (0.641) (0.293) (0.633)
Cumm Gap V 0.044*** 0.050** 0.041*** 0.049**
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021)
Last Gap V 0.316 0.121 0.208 0.014
(0.249) (0.593) (0.250) (0.591)
Cumm Gap S 0.048*** 0.094*** 0.047*** 0.091***
(0.013) (0.027) (0.013) (0.027)
Last Gap S 0.521* 1.245 0.369 1.006
(0.288) (0.771) (0.287) (0.764)
Cumm Gap T -0.002 -0.010 0.000 -0.013
(0.010) (0.022) (0.010) (0.022)
Last Gap T 0.095 0.133 0.107 0.210
(0.206) (0.687) (0.209) (0.687)
Observations 47,862 16,353 47,862 16,353 47,862 16,353
R-squared 0.328 0.348 0.327 0.346 0.330 0.351
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
See Table 2.3 for further details.
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Table B.2: Depreciation Rates (GLS)
VARIABLES LTC C+ LTC C+ LTC C+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math -0.074*** -0.052*** -0.074*** -0.115*** -0.049*** -0.055***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Verbal -0.151*** 0.302*** -0.145*** 0.281*** -0.169*** 0.254***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Science -0.137*** -0.270*** -0.139*** -0.220*** -0.156*** -0.258***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Technical 0.352*** 0.208*** 0.355*** 0.262*** 0.351*** 0.224***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Cumm Gap 0.042*** 0.101*** 0.051*** 0.107***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Last Gap -0.545*** -0.980*** -0.531*** -0.966***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Cumm Gap M -0.038*** -0.057*** -0.035*** -0.055***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Last Gap M -1.070*** -0.418*** -1.034*** -0.339***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Cumm Gap V 0.038*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Last Gap V 0.338*** 1.723*** 0.300*** 1.708***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Cumm Gap S 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Last Gap S 1.129*** -0.365*** 1.068*** -0.424***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013)
Cumm Gap T 0.000 0.035*** 0.003*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Last Gap T -0.008** -0.376*** -0.007* -0.438***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011)
Observations 40,411 14,345 40,411 14,345 40,411 14,345
Individuals 3,796 1,385 3,796 1,385 3,796 1,385
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted by their respective
first letter.
See Table 2.3 for further details.
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Table B.3: Gender-specific Depreciation Rates (GLS)
Male Female
VARIABLES LTC C+ LTC C+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math -0.061*** -0.098*** 0.010*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Verbal -0.293*** -0.019*** 0.014*** 0.563***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Science -0.121*** -0.269*** -0.185*** -0.504***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Technical 0.348*** 0.370*** 0.252*** 0.404***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Cumm Gap 0.014*** 0.046*** 0.132*** 0.203***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Last Gap -0.631*** -1.026*** -0.490*** -0.768***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Cumm Gap M -0.009*** -0.022*** -0.056*** -0.043***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Last Gap M -1.400*** 1.001*** -0.417*** -1.777***
(0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014)
Cumm Gap V 0.035*** 0.017*** -0.001*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Last Gap V 0.041*** 2.402*** 0.041*** 1.224***
(0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013)
Cumm Gap S -0.014*** -0.020*** 0.088*** 0.087***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Last Gap S 1.430*** -2.151*** 0.608*** 1.323***
(0.007) (0.020) (0.009) (0.015)
Cumm Gap T 0.036*** 0.074*** -0.004*** -0.058***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Last Gap T 0.219*** -0.513*** 0.389*** -0.654***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017)
Observations 22,663 7,876 17,748 6,469
Individuals 1,872 671 1,924 714
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Math (M), verbal (V), science (S) and technical (T) variables are denoted
by their respective first letter.
See Table 2.3 for further details.
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C.1 Data Appendix: Aptitude Measures
This appendix lists the definition of the three DOT variables referenced in the paper.
The three aptitude variables used are from the DOT 1977 and 1991 editions. We are
unable to use the DOT successor, the Occupational Information Network (O*net), due
to a measurement discontinuity in the recorded aptitudes.
In general, aptitudes measure the ability an individual must possess in order to
perform a job successfully. More precisely, the measure is a function of the share in
the population that meets this ability level. That is, there are five categories: (1) the
bottom 10 percent of the population, (2) the bottom third excluding the bottom 10
percent, (3) the middle third, (4) the top third excluding the top 10 percent, and (5)
the top 10 percent. We translate these measures to a scale ranging from zero to one,
e.g., an aptitude above 0.66 would correspond to an individual in the top-third of the
population.
Out of the 11 measures reported in the DOT 1977 and 1991, we use the three
measures: general, numerical and verbal ability.
 General ability is the ability to understand instructions, understand principles
and to make judgments. It encompasses a number of skills, e.g., using logic
and scientific thinking, understanding procedures, establishing facts and drawing
conclusions, etc. This measure is highly correlated with the ability to perform
well in school.
 Numerical aptitude is the ability to perform arithmetic. The complexity and
speed of operations is taken into account when assigning the category.
 Verbal aptitude is the ability to understand and use language eﬀectively. Both
oral and written skills, including the use of technical terminology, are taken into
account when assigning categories for each occupation.
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C.2 Empirical Appendix: Estimating MBTC Over
Time
Figure 3.4 graphs the relative wage rates between high-math college and non-college
occupations, and low-math college and non-college occupations. Relative wages are
normalized to zero in 1974 for easy comparison of the two MBTC and SBTC trends.
Relative labor supplies and, consequently, relative wages rates, are computed fol-
lowing Hansen (1993) in estimating labor eﬃciency units at time t as,
LEjt =
X
k
 kLjt;k; (C.1)
where Ljt;k is the total labor supply of group k of labor type j = fu; e;meg (non-college
(u), low-math college labor (e) and high-math labor (me)), and  k is the group’s weight.
Weights are determined by,
 k =
!k
!
; (C.2)
the average log weekly wage of group k over the average wage of the entire population
(across individuals over the entire time period). Groups are made up of a given five-
year birth cohort, sex and education group (high school dropout, high school graduate,
some college, college graduate, and post-graduate).
Using this definition of eﬃciency units of labor, log relative wage rates are,
ln(wjt)  ln(wut) =
X
k
fjt;k
!jt;k
LEjt
 
X
k
fut;k
!ut;k
LEut
for j = e;me; (C.3)
where fjt;k is the fraction of group k of labor type j individuals in the economy each
period.
C.2.1 Quantifying MBTC versus SBTC
Given wage rates and relative labor supplies, we can quantify the diﬀerence between
SBTC and MBTC as captured in Figure 3.4.
Analogous to the firms problem in Section 3.3, we define a nested-CES between the
three types of labor j = fu; e;meg,
Yt =
h
Lut + (1  )

 (AtLet)
 + (1  ) (AtMtLmet)
 

i 1

; (C.4)
with SBTC (labor augmenting technology for all college graduates equally) as, At =
(1 + at)At 1 and MBTC (labor augmenting technology for high-math labor only) as,
Mt = (1 + mt)Mt 1.
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From the firm’s cost minimization problem, we obtain two relative wage equations,
ln

wet
wut

 C + (   1) ln

Let
Lut

+  ln (At) +
1  

Mt

   


Lmet
Let

(C.5)
and
ln

wmet
wut

 C + (   1) ln

Lmet
Lut

+  ln (At) +
 ln (Mt) +

1  

1
Mt

   


Let
Lmet

: (C.6)
Equation (C.5) shows the college premium of low-math college graduates relative to
non-college labor, and Equation (C.6) shows the relationship between high-math college
graduate wages and non-college wage returns. As in Krusell et al. (2000), we can
analyze the growth in relative wages using these two equations, assuming  = 1  ,
gwet   gwut = (  1)gLet   (   1)gLut + gAt + (   ) (gLmet + gMt) (C.7)
and
gwmet   gwut = (  1)gLmet   (   1)gLut + gAt + gMt + (   )gLet : (C.8)
With the two Equations (C.7) and (C.8) we can compute the two unknowns of interest,
gAt = at and gMt = mt.
Having computed eﬃciency units of labor and relative wages rates from the CPS
1974 to 2010, all that remains is pinning down the elasticities between college and
non-college labor, 1
1  , and between low- and high-math labor,
1
1  . The parameter
 = 0:597 is set as in the simulation (see Section 3.4). However,  used here is not
directly comparable with the parameter from Section 3.3. Therefore, in the appendix
we estimate  using CPS data.
The firm’s nested-CES minimization problem provides the following relative wage
equation,
ln(wmet)  ln(wet) = ln

(1  )


+  ln(Mt) + (  1) ln

Lmet
Lhet

: (C.9)
Assuming a linear time trend for ln(Mt), we can estimate this equation using relative
wages and eﬃciency units of labor to obtain . Table C.1 summarizes the results.
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Table C.1: College-Labor CES
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Time 0.002 (0.000)
Labor Supply -0.274 (0.104)
Intercept -0.035 (0.066)
N 37
R2 0.821
Statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The parameter  = 0:726 is significant at five percent.1 In contrast, the equivalent
regression for non-college labor suggests perfect substitution between low- and high-
math uneducated labor. This is also consistent with the findings of Figure 3.2b.
With the elasticity parameters,  = 0:726 and  = 0:597, we can compute the
growth in At and Mt to be consistent with the growth in relative wages of non-
college/college and low-/high-math labor, given the growth in eﬃciency units from
the CPS during 1974 to 2010.
Using the whole time period, this simple accounting exercise suggests that et =
0:021 and met = 0:003. That is, MBTC is positive and larger than zero. To put this
value into perspective, comparing At versus At Mt, the growth rates suggest that
labor augmenting technical change on high-math occupations grew about 16 percent
per annum faster than on low-math occupations.
For robustness, using  of plus/minus one standard deviation,  = 0:621 and  =
0:830, the relative growth of At Mt is 14 and 17 percent larger, respectively. The
more complimentary the two types of college labor, the smaller MBTC needs to be to
match the relative wage growth of both low- and high-math labor to non-college labor.
1The elasticity is not sensitive to the precise partitioning of low- and high-math occupations. For
example, splitting the sample by the top-third versus bottom two-third yields similar results.
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